

JPRS 75157

19 February 1980

Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2080



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Indexes to this report (by keyword, author, personal names, title and series) are available from Bell & Howell, Old Mansfield Road, Wooster, Ohio 44691.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

| | | | | |
|--|--|--|---|------------------------------|
| REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE | | 1. REPORT NO. JPRS 75157 | 2. | 3. Recipient's Accession No. |
| 4. Title and Subtitle NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT, No. 2080 | | | 5. Report Date 19 February 1980 | |
| 7. Author(s) | | | 8. Performing Organization Rept. No. | |
| 9. Performing Organization Name and Address Joint Publications Research Service 1000 North Glebe Road Arlington, Virginia 22201 | | | 10. Project/Task/Work Unit No. | |
| | | | 11. Contract(C) or Grant(G) No. (C) (G) | |
| 12. Sponsoring Organization Name and Address As above | | | 13. Type of Report & Period Covered | |
| | | | 14. | |
| 15. Supplementary Notes | | | | |
| 16. Abstract (Limit: 200 words) This serial report contains information on socioeconomic, government, political, and technical developments in the countries of the Near East and North Africa. | | | | |
| 17. Document Analysis a. Descriptors | | | | |
| Political Science | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Inter-Arab Affairs | <input type="checkbox"/> Libya | <input type="checkbox"/> Sultanate of Oman | |
| Sociology | <input type="checkbox"/> North African Affairs | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Mauritania | <input type="checkbox"/> Syria | |
| Economics | <input type="checkbox"/> Afghanistan | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Morocco | <input type="checkbox"/> Tunisia | |
| Culture (Social Sciences) | <input type="checkbox"/> Algeria | <input type="checkbox"/> People's Democratic Republic of Yemen | <input type="checkbox"/> United Arab Emirates | |
| Ethnology | <input type="checkbox"/> Bahrain | <input type="checkbox"/> Persian Gulf Area | <input type="checkbox"/> Western Sahara | |
| Geography | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Egypt | <input type="checkbox"/> Qatar | <input type="checkbox"/> Yemen Arab Republic | |
| Techological | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Iran | <input type="checkbox"/> Saudi Arabia | | |
| Military Sciences | <input type="checkbox"/> Iraq | <input type="checkbox"/> Spanish North Africa | | |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> Israel | <input type="checkbox"/> Sudan | | |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> Jordan | | | |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> Kuwait | | | |
| | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Lebanon | | | |
| b. Identifiers/Open-Ended Terms | | | | |
| c. COSATI Field/Group 5D, 5C, 5K, 15 | | | | |
| 18. Availability Statement Unlimited Availability Sold by NTIS Springfield, Virginia 22161 | | 19. Security Class (This Report) UNCLASSIFIED | | 21. No. of Pages 69 |
| | | 20. Security Class (This Page) UNCLASSIFIED | | 22. Price |

19 February 1980

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2080

| CONTENTS | PAGE |
|---|------|
| INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS | |
| Lawful and Unlawful, According to Khomeyni (Fu'ad Matar; AL-MUSTAQBAL, 15 Dec 79) | 1 |
| AFGHANISTAN | |
| Occupation Coupled With Humiliation (LE POINT, 14 Jan 80) | 11 |
| EGYPT | |
| Law Establishes Military Medical Academy (AL-JARIDAH AL-RASMIYAH, 22 Nov 79) | 15 |
| Law Amends Pay for Military in Civilian Jobs (AL-JARIDAH AL-RASMIYAH, 8 Nov 79) | 23 |
| IRAN | |
| Prosecutor Investigates Komiteh Occupying U.S. Embassy (KEYHAN, 24 Jan 80) | 25 |
| Prosecution of Forqan Group Gets Underway (KEYHAN, 24 Jan 80) | 30 |
| Esfahan Committees Merge With Guards in Peace Move (KEYHAN, 5 Jan 80) | 32 |
| Names of 106 Candidates for President Announced (KEYHAN, 5 Jan 80) | 34 |
| Development Aid Now Expected in Return for Oil (Brigitte Gros; LE MONDE, 3 Jan 80) | 40 |

| CONTENTS (Continued) | Page |
|--|------|
| Khomeyni Revolution Lacks Export Appeal (T. D. Allman; ATHENS NEWS, 30 Jan 80) | 43 |
| Briefs | |
| Forqan Members Seized | 47 |
| LEBANON | |
| Montazeri Representative Ahmed al-Sadiki Comments on Iranian Volunteers (L'ORIENT-LE JOUR, 15 Dec 79) | 48 |
| Statement by Ex-President Camille Sham'un (L'ORIENT-LE JOUR, 24 Dec 79) | 52 |
| Disappearance of Syrians in East Beirut (L'ORIENT-LE JOUR, 16 Dec 79) | 54 |
| Bank of Lebanon Releases Statistics (L'ORIENT-LE JOUR, 23 Dec 79) | 55 |
| MAURITANIA | |
| Nation's Political, Economic Situation Reviewed (WEST AFRICA, 14 Jan 80) | 57 |
| MOROCCO | |
| American, Western Attitudes Toward Middle East, Iran Criticized (Editorial; LIBERATION, 30 Nov-6 Dec 79) | 60 |
| PPS Politburo Member Simon Levy Discusses Moroccan- Spanish Relations (Simon Levy Interview; AL BAYANE, 25 Dec 79) | 63 |
| Club Mediterranee Cultural Event Criticized (LIBERATION, 30 Nov-6 Dec 79) | 67 |

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

LAWFUL AND UNLAWFUL, ACCORDING TO KHOMEYNI

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 15 Dec 79 pp 59-63

[Article by Fu'ad Matar]

[Text] Before a group of Iranian students stormed the U.S. embassy in Tehran, seized the equipment and documents in it, and shackled the hands and feet of the diplomats who worked in it, Ayatollah Khomeini had registered a previous position on the plane of his rejection of the United States and the West in general, represented in his statement that he would like to build a wall like the Great Wall of China to separate his country from the United States and the West in general.

Before that, he had considered music unlawful on the ground that the profundity of the verses of the Koran nourishes the soul.

Before that time, he had said much in his councils concerning those things which are lawful and those things which are unlawful.

In the near future, if the state of the current critical situation in U.S.-Iranian relations should go beyond the point of explosion, the draft of the constitution would be changed to a permanent constitution which would have separate chapters on those things which are lawful and those things which are unlawful and would constitute an entrance to the form of a new society which would pull up the traditional Iranian society by the roots.

There are those who assume that the factor of age causes Khomeini to progress gradually in proclaiming lawful and unlawful things in a form which appears to be totally contradictory to that which prevails in the modern age. However, that is not true, for Imam Khomeini defined what is lawful and what is unlawful 15 years ago, in the prime of his intellectual and religious maturity. Therefore, what he proclaimed was not the result of the weight of age on him, but the result of his convictions.

When we leaf through his voluminous work, "A Treatise on Means", we find that all that he said in matters touching on the social actuality after his return from exile [is material which] he had mentioned in his book

which we have cited. The book is in two parts.

We publish here some of the material which is contained on the two parts of the book concerning those things which are lawful and those things which are unlawful, doing so on the basis that this is what will prevail after Khomeini establishes his power and the draft constitution becomes a permanent constitution.

Before we publish what we have selected, there are some observations which we should like to set forth here to provide a more adequate clarification of what has happened in Iran and what will happen with the passage of time.

The first observation is that Imam Khomeini has neither become acquainted with the civilization of the West nor lived in the West. Rather, he has considered everything that does not originate from the spirit of Islam and its traditions to be imported from the West, and, since that which has been imported is characterized by decadence, then there is some justification to Khomeini's statement that he would like to build a wall like the Great Wall of China to separate himself from the United States and the West.

The second observation is that there are among the masses of the Iranian revolution many elements who have studied and lived in the United States and Europe, and it is not clear how these reconcile their view of the West with Khomeini's, especially since there are some among them who participate in the administration of the regime through sensitive positions and positions of leadership.

The third observation is that, although Imam Khomeini's ideas and concepts may not be a subject of debate or discussion by the "society of religious scholars" in the Iranian regime, they are nevertheless assuredly a subject of uneasiness on the part of the "society of technocrats" in that regime. The basic problem is that the first of these two societies will prevail in the end because of the influence that the religious scholars wield over the Iranian masses, in addition to the important part which they played in bringing the revolution to pass and in bringing down the shah and which will be well rewarded.

The fourth observation is that Imam Khomeini's concepts, with regard to some of the lawful and unlawful things which they contain, appear in their motivations similar to the lawful and unlawful things of Mao Zedong, the leader of the Chinese revolution. Mao intended to rescue the Chinese society from crime and opium, and succeeded in doing so; and the leader of the Iranian revolution intends to rescue the Iranian society from corruption, which has grown worse in it. However, Mao Zedong's lawful and unlawful things were not based on religion, as is the case with Khomeini, and the fact that Khomeini's are based on religion means that they will become established and that it will never be an easy matter to review them.

The fifth observation is that Imam Khomeini's lawful and unlawful things

take us back to before the age of technology; one can sense that from a careful perusal of their content.

Some conspicuous contradictions appear here, and a conflict occurs between the imam's concepts and the reality of the age of technology. Here, his statement about the wall that he would like to build to separate his country from the West and Europe appears somewhat illogical.

Furthermore, the technology of the West is advantageous in some of its aspects for spreading and establishing the Islamic revolution. Is not the aircraft that brought Imam Khomeini back to Tehran from his exile in France a part of the product of technology? Is not the microphone which Imam Khomeini and his fellow leaders of the revolution in Iran use a part of the product of technology? Are not the rifles with which the revolutionary guard is to clash with the U.S. military intervention a part of the product of technology?

Furthermore, are not the cassettes by means of which Imam Khomeini bestows his voice and his instructions on the masses in Iran a part of the product of technology?

The total rejection of the West and the modern age on the ground of returning to essentials is a subject which concerns turning toward the originally deteriorated backwardness in Iran and most of the nations of the Middle East and the Third World.

Furthermore, although the return to essentials will undoubtedly have the effect of raising morale and creating a state of spiritual purity, the failure to couple it with extensive connection with the modern age will have the effect of frustrating the aspirations of the people toward the astonishing development which the West is witnessing.

The sixth observation is that Imam Khomeini's lawful and unlawful things, which will turn into fixed principles in the light of whose content cooperation can be effected, will not be easy to enforce, and the reception of them by the citizen, no matter how revolutionary he may be, and no matter how fervently he wishes to return to essentials, will never be an easy matter.

Before their enforcement, the things which are lawful and the things which are unlawful appear to be an attractive thesis and a self-sustaining world of ideals. That is so because, with the attempts to inject modernism into the concepts which the Islamic call has isolated, there has occurred a kind of gradual movement away from those concepts, and it is natural that that should happen with the transition of the Moslem from one age to another.

But the hard question to answer, from the time before the enforcement till the bitter end, is this: "Is the imposition of the lawful and the unlawful things, as Khomeini sets them forth, going to be an easy matter in its application? Will it be as easy as all that to turn and go backwards?"

The seventh observation is that the society in Iran which wants Imam Khomeini to prevail in it appears to be the most desirable society from the point of view of the man of religion, and appears to be the society which is free of taint from the point of view of the religious citizen.

However, this society appears very strict in the view of the ordinary citizen, and appears to be a most strict society to the eyes of the Moslem outside of Iran.

The eighth observation is that, in making a complete estimate of the Khomeini view of the ideal society which he seeks, it must be borne in mind that those things which are lawful and those things which are unlawful were set forth at a time other than the present. At the time when they were set forth, it was necessary to set them forth. If they had not been set forth, there would have been a religious slackening. Furthermore, they were a kind of body of laws which regulated the relationship between the people and the relationship between the governors and the governed.

But times change, and it is necessary to assume that the change cancels the relationship with the roots. We believe that the crisis of the Moslem of the 15th Islamic century, and his crisis as he lives in the closing years of a Christian century and the beginning of a new one, is not a religious crisis, but rather the crisis of national independence on one hand and remoteness from the modern age on the other hand. An evidence that the crisis is not a religious one is that the Moslem is surrounded by a new kind of ideologies which cast shadows on his religion and his beliefs.

What all of the effort ought to be expended for is a studied approach to modernity instead of the renunciation of it with all of its adjuncts.

Although Khomeini is a man of religion before being a politician, nevertheless the fire that he kindled in the hearts of the persecuted and deprived people inside and outside of Iran caused him to launch a nationalistic awakening rather than a religious one.

We do not understand how the enforcement of Imam Khomeini's lawful and unlawful things is to come about; indeed, we do not understand whether the enforcement is to be done in letter and in spirit or whether those lawful and unlawful things are to be a matter concerning which legislation is to be enacted.

Lawful and unlawful things are not a new subject, but Imam Khomeini is very zealous concerning questions which have to do with the modern age. It is natural that, as a religious authority who forms independent judgments and introduces additions, especially since he is in the midst of a fraternity of persons who can be classified as authorities on religion and Islamic law, he creates, if the term may be used, a kind of competition. However, Imam Khomeini is the most industrious in forming independent judgments, and he has ruled on what shall be lawful and what shall be

unlawful even for the Moslem who travels in a space craft and how he shall pray.

At this point, we find ourselves wondering, "Is it not enough to cling to the fundamentals (that is, the Koran and the Sunnah), especially since all of the sects in Islam support them, from the Maliki to the Shafi'i to the Hanafi to the Hanbali to the Ja'fari to the Imami to the Zahiri to the Khawariji, etc.? Is it not enough to cling to the fundamentals without there being painful additions?"

Indeed, we wonder whether these additions had to be made, and, if so, why they were not additions which would relax to some extent the restrictions of the lawful and unlawful things of the past.

It is natural that such words as these will be pleasing to the men of religion, but it is [is not?] a certainty that they will be pleasing to the broad sectors of Moslems who are told by the men of religion that they are not religious enough or that their Islam is somewhat deficient so long as they fail to observe meticulously the things which are lawful and the things which are unlawful.

The ninth observation is that Imam Khomeini represents a tendency in Islamic thought to which we have not been previously accustomed, or, rather, which is not so important as the tendencies which Islam has witnessed since Muhammad's call, and this tendency is primarily concerned with his rejection of anything that influences Islam.

He did not achieve his tremendous victory in bringing down the empire of the shah merely because he is God-fearing and pious, but rather for several reasons, one of them being that the shah was able for a quarter of a century to destroy all opposition to his regime by all means and to eradicate all parties and newspapers which were potential channels of opposition. Then, not being satisfied with doing those deeds inside of the country, he hunted down his opponents to the ends of the earth and fabricated charges to annihilate any seed of opposition so that it would not grow, and this is what made SAVAK feared and dreaded.

When the shah tried to strike down the sole remaining avenue of opposition, after striking down the rest of them, he found it impossible to do so. The channel to which we refer is the religious presence, which is different from all other presences.

The religious presence in Iran is firmly entrenched, and has popular bases. It differs sharply from the other religious entities, such as that of al-Azhar, for example, which, because it is not deep-rooted and in absolute control of the state, did not hesitate to issue a formal legal opinion which permitted conciliation with Israel when President Anwar al-Sadat asked it to do so, and this action caused al-Azhar to lose its power.

When we discourse on the established religious presence in Iran, we take into account a matter of extreme importance which is practiced in Shi'ite

Islam, the khums. The khums imposes on every Shi'ite the duty to give one-fifth of his income to the imam, and, by virtue of it, the ayatollahs in Iran have been able to become an economic entity entirely independent of the state, so that they are not concerned with whether they receive state aid or not.

Hence, when it is said that the Iranian people financed Khomeini's revolution, this is a true statement. When we were visiting Imam Khomeini at his French place of exile in Neauphle-le-Chateau, we were impressed by the arrival of some people from Tehran bringing money to which he was legally entitled because it represented the khums to which we have referred. In this frame of reference, it can be said that the Iranian revolution is the only revolution in the Third World which has been almost self-financed.

Imam Khomeini was not victorious over the shah because he was such a great religious authority, but rather because, in his remoteness, he became in the eyes of the Iranian people the symbol of opposition to all of the shah's aspirations and barbaric practices, such as his determination to Persianize Iran as a country without Islamic roots and his call to do so with encouragement from the West, which tried hard to put into practice the ideas of Phoenicianizing Lebanon and Pharaonicizing Egypt, the call to squander the natural resources as if they belonged to someone other than their owners, so that Iran became like a cow that grazed and lived on its own land while others drank its milk, with the United States getting the choice share of it, the call for political banishment when the shah was everything, and the call for social banishment when the shah began to introduce implants into the Iranian society in the shadow of Western interpretations and under the shadow of innovation. This is something which has done unparalleled harm to him, because this attempt was made at the expense of Iran's nobility and origins.

This firm stand of the Iranians on the side of Khomeini does not signify a yearning for religious rule, but rather a desire for the correction of the course of affairs in general, for, just as the shah turned in a deviationistic and unstudied manner toward modernization, to the detriment of Iran, the Iranians felt deep within themselves that the acceptance of Khomeini's concepts part and parcel would also hurt Iran.

Although it is true that Imam Khomeini's purity concerns them greatly, nevertheless they feel some apprehension within themselves, because the imam is removed from the modern age and some of its essential components. Indeed, he appears more and more determined to put into practice his ideas of what is lawful and what is unlawful, and there is a likelihood that he is not disposed to make any compromises concerning them.

If Imam Khomeini should be successful in nationalizing the social and class struggles after they became a national issue, then these struggles would float to the surface anew after matters settled.

We do not believe that the amazing strength which Khomeini showed in the frame of national mobilization, in which he succeeded in making Iranian aviators wear their shrouds over their battle dress and making young men and women hasten to become trained in the use of weapons when signs of U.S. military intervention appeared on the horizon, can be repeated in the frame of religious mobilization in the imam's concept, especially since, in the administrative frame, he possesses no alternatives to the literal application of the concepts of the Shi'ite movement, including the enforcement of the lawful and unlawful things which were set forth in the remote past to be applied at that time and not today.

The tenth observation is that the experiment of confrontation with the United States into which Khomeini plunged added a new dimension to his revolution. In that confrontation, he showed stiffness of the spine, not being prepared to bargain or maneuver. He also appeared afraid, because no leader in the Third World, not even 'Abd-al-Nasir, had defied the United States in the manner in which he has done so without taking the flexibility out of the struggle.

Because the United States is not capable of such an intention, or because of the feelings which great strength generates, or both together, the United States gave Imam Khomeini an opportunity to struggle against it in the same manner in which the shah did so. The situation looks as if Imam Khomeini had found a mine field and was sitting in wait for it to explode and blow up the U.S. political manipulators.

Furthermore, the problem of the United States was that it did not have experience in dealing with religious leaders who can adopt political decisions. Indeed, history records that the United States failed miserably in dealing with a religious leader like the late bishop and metropolitan Makarios, even taking into account the large disparity between Makarios and Khomeini. When we refer to the failure, we refer to the childish "game of nations". This game brought down Metropolitan Makarios for a while, but he came back in spite of the will of those who played the game skillfully, and they looked as if they were not proficient.

Likewise, the problem of the United States is that it faces for the first time leaderships which are not in the least concerned with the religious life or whether the regime survives or perishes. Neither are they concerned about the standing and authority of the regime, and they behave with the conviction that the position of Islam was much more attractive in the days when there were no natural resources and petroleum, and in the days of the sword and the horse, when the chivalry of Islam and the Moslems was much more important.

And so the United States has not been able to bargain over anything, and Imam Khomeini has put it into a real cage, destroying the growing conviction that it cannot be defeated and that nobody can defy it, and, at the same time, putting out of people's minds the prevailing impression that

the United States is in back of every change and that the peoples have no strength and no might.

Any victory that Imam Khomeini can win over the United States means that he will become enabled to impose his ideas on the Islamic world and eliminate forever an impression which has prevailed in it for a quarter of a century, the impression that Islam and the Moslems are the nearest to the United States and that the Islamic movements, wherever they are to be found, are movements which have come about by virtue of coordination with the U.S. apparatuses.

The victory which Imam Khomeini will win, whatever its kind and its size may be, will consecrate him a leader against whom no will may prevail, even if his will be the application of Islam in his own concept or with those principles of lawful and unlawful things which were laid down centuries ago.

The eleventh observation is that Imam Khomeini's battles since the time when he was removed to Iraq, then exiled to France, and finally brought back from exile, have been centered on vengeance. Vengeance on the shah, who elevated some of the members of the Baha'i sect, who prevailed at the expense of the deep-rooted society of the ayatollahs; vengeance on the shah, who made ravening wolves of the SAVAK men and turned them loose to track people down at home and abroad and to rape, dishonor, and spread depravity; vengeance on the shah, who broke his heart by murdering his son Mustafa; vengeance on the shah, who appointed himself policeman for the United States in the area to hunt down Islam and the Moslems; vengeance on the shah, who clasped the hand of Zionism and gave it leave to maneuver in Iran and feed itself on Iran's petroleum to attack the Arabs, to dishonor the reputation of Islam, to occupy the al-Aqsa mosque, and to treat with contempt any Arab nationalist who had a grievance in the Moslem world; and vengeance on the United States, which is responsible for all this.

As we write these words, we do not understand to what length the confrontation between Imam Khomeini and the United States will go, nor do we know how great will be the victory that will be won in this confrontation.

However, it is our firm opinion, on the basis of hypothesis and supposition, that Imam Khomeini's attacks will never cease.

On the basis of statements which we have heard from some of those who frequent his council, Imam Khomeini appears to be planning in the depths of his heart to avenge the members of the family of the Prophet and turn 'Ashura' [the Shi'ite day of mourning for the martyr Husayn] into an occasion of joy, on which Shi'ites will smile instead of bewailing Hasan, Husayn, and all those who were martyred with them and for their sakes.

It remains also that it was necessary to have some light cast on his per-

sonality and his method in the administration of the struggle so that an evaluation of his lawful and unlawful things can be made.

It also remains that a careful study of the lawful and unlawful things will show clearly the extent of the relationship between Khomeini and the modern age — indeed, if the expression may be permitted, the extent of the contradiction between the two.

From the lawful and unlawful things, we have selected that which is connected directly with the life of man and what can be considered interference in his affairs and conduct daily. The things which are lawful and things which are unlawful take some hundreds of pages in their totality.

It may seem that our discourse on the subject of things which are lawful and things which are unlawful is untimely. Our reply to that is that Imam Khomeini has remained a public issue, and he is indeed the foremost public issue in the 1980's and the Islamic 15th century, which has just begun. Whenever anyone becomes a public issue, the subject of inquiry into his ideas and absorption in his legacy becomes in every way a matter of necessity for the completion of the picture of that person, even if the questions which pertain to his writings and his legacy are old ones.

We are living at the beginning of a new era which historians may describe as "the Khomeini era", the era in which nationalism was blended into the religious question. If it is premature to write about this era before the situation is firmly settled, then it is all the more necessary to write about its antecedents and its background. The lawful and unlawful things which we have selected and dealt with are only some of the indications of the antecedents and background to which we refer. Is it not a matter of the utmost necessity that we contemplate this illustrious shaykh who has plunged into the impossible venture of defying the United States, not merely in token and in words, but in practice and in deed, who has defined for the Moslem, in the frame of those things which are lawful and those things which are unlawful, how he shall fast and pray if he happens to be in a space vehicle, and that we contemplate how he is pleased to legislate concerning the relationship between woman and man, what is lawful and what is unlawful in food, drink, and so forth?

These lawful and unlawful things may appear normal to those who have lived in Shi'ite religious societies and to Khomeini's peers in the other eight movements of Islam. However, since those persons constitute only a minority, we have taken it on ourselves to examine Khomeini's ideological legacy, and we have selected this portion as a way to present him to the reader, whatever his mode of thinking and his religious persuasion may be. When we read in these lawful and unlawful things Imam Khomeini's call saying, "The tax is to be collected from the Jews and Christians without distinction between Protestant and Catholic," it becomes natural to consider this work the concern of everybody.

And so we go back to where we started and wonder, "Are the lawful and unlawful things going to be some of the stones in the wall that Imam Khomeini wants to build like the Great Wall of China between Iran and the United States?"

CSO: 4802

OCCUPATION COUPLED WITH HUMILIATION

Paris LE POINT in French 14 Jan 80 pp 46,47,48

[Text] Confronting the deployment of the Red Army, the Afghan people fall silent and hate. But they are revengeful. The number of Soviet soldiers killed or stoned increases every day.

One, two, three, ten, thirteen tanks. In the chilly dawn of Kabul mornings, at the foot of Karte Parwan, in a grey district of the capital, the column marches slowly as usual, Bren gun carriers rattling, as though they are sure of their rights. Noses reddened by the cold (it is -3°), furred caps pushed down to their ears, the Soviets are rolling along their heads high, wholly intent on their mission, to show Kabul today who actually is in power. Fourteen, 15, 17, 20 tanks, the column has just passed by. Their fingers stiff, their somber eyes staring at the pavement, on that morning the people of Kabul never stopped counting.

Eighty-five thousand soldiers. In spite of the West's crying shame, Afghanistan and its 17 million Afghans, have in their country, although it is a sovereign country, seven Red army divisions. A massive presence, which the astounded world discovered after Christmas as they witnessed the Soviet Union very skilfully realizing three objectives in less than 48 hours: the overthrow on Thursday, on the night of 27 December, of a Marxist who was not pleasing to them, Hafizullah Amin; his rapid replacement by Babrak Karmal, 50 years old, a talented orator, probably more Marxist than his predecessor; the arrival of the Red army on the Afghan plains and plateaux, which the tsars coveted for many centuries. And as a consequence, the possibility for Moscow not only to make into a satellite a country which was still shaken by a Moslem rebellion, but also to threaten beyond the neighboring Pakistan and Iran, the warm seas and the oil wells of the gulf. In short, a windfall, diplomats who were met by accident in Shar-i-Nao, the embassy quarter, are still talking about it and are flabbergasted.

For example, does anyone know that on 12 December last, while many Soviet divisions were keeping warm along the Soviet Afghan border, Gen Victor F. Papoutine, the deputy minister of Soviet interior, arrived in Kabul, accompanied by a large KGB delegation? Apparently, not. The official pretext

of this journey: to reorganize the Afghan security services; in reality, to prepare for Amin's eviction. But on 19 December a volley of shots were fired in the House of People. Gravely wounded, the deputy minister, repatriated immediately to Moscow, died a few days later. This heart-breaking blunder will inflame the machine. Some Soviet officer-engineers, serving in the Afghan army in the role of advisers induced their Afghan counterparts to disassemble the batteries with which the Afghan armored cars are equipped: for their winter inspection. Then on the afternoon of 27 December, the Soviet command invites the elite of the Afghan senior officers to a "vodka party" to celebrate Soviet-Afghan friendship. Two hours later, drunk, most of them found themselves locked up in icy rooms. That same night, at 1915 the coup was launched.

Since then the "Russi" are everywhere, with the exception of center-town they encircle the approaches to the city in a defensive perimeter staked out at six exact assembly points. Two elite divisions, the 105th and 306th airborne, are dividing the task of "defending" the capital. Both in eager emulation are buried in the light snow; they have at their disposal such sophisticated, such varied armaments that it seems as though we are flipping through the Red army's perfect infantryman's catalogue. Reconnaissance weapons: heavy and light, armored tractor-drawn, BRDM type 1 and 2, T 54, 55, 62, 72 tanks. Bren gun carriers for all types of terrain, amphibious equipped with high-speed guns, "orgues de Stalin" [Katiouchka rocket-launcher], antitank guns sometimes pointed in the direction of the Afghan barracks. Unquestionably, the Russians are here to spend more than the winter season.

The most significant element in this Soviet presence? The little men with the long brown overcoats, with eyes like slits and Mongolian cheek-bones who shouting raucously chase swarms of curious urchins, are the Tadjiks, Usbek and Turkmen of the red army, who speak most of the vehicular Afghan languages. They are the very image of Gengis Khan's great-grandchildren, and it is said that they represent 90 percent of the strength of the Soviet contingent, the remaining 10 percent being the Russian officers, who are white. Evidently this is not an accident. Moscow had hoped that in the absence of an acceptance of the occupation, this "asiatized" troupe would, in a roundabout way, blend more easily in the Afghan masses, and because of the confusion in "coloration" the occupation would at least be accepted. A wish that was never fulfilled. Hate, contempt and the humiliation of putting up in silence with these armored cohorts are evident. In the smokey old tea-houses (the "tchai khana"), there are looks that do not lie. "Tika, Tika" (let us cut them up in small round disks). This slogan has been making the rounds many times in the Bazaar. Kabul and the Afghans hate the Russians and they let it be known.

A few examples? It was stated positively in the best-informed foreign circles that since 27 December more than 30 Soviet soldiers have been killed, some were stoned with bricks, others were shot like rabbits in an ambush in the periphery of the city, or even stabbed like the two unfortunate recruits who had argued with a butcher over the price of his meat.

Cruel, but a revelation of a hostile climate. After all, in the thick of the battle on 27 December last it is known now that the remainder of the Afghan army stood fiercely in opposition to the Soviet commandos, especially around the television building. Fighting and dying not for the defense of Amin, but for the honor of Afghanistan.

Therefore, in view of the actual risks of possible and future city terrorism, the Soviet presence long, or short, (the best specialists figure at least 4 months) risks being, at least psychologically, uncomfortable. The masterly head of operations on the terrain, at present USSR ambassador, a tartar by origin and a Moslem, Fikrat Tabiev knows it well. It is said that he spends incalculable time issuing instructions to his compatriots urging them to be cautious. Confined to the living rooms of the Kabul hotel, a sad yellowish building in center-town, where they have been parked, the Soviet civilian councillors avoid walking in the city. In the evening near every intersection, it is only in the black of night that Yvan, Yuri and Gregory, these young chubby-faced Soviet soldiers, arrive to insure the changing of the Afghan guards.

Wise measures. They only serve to recognize reality, local sensitiveness, as Moscow has done for a very long time with its Moslem republics. In one word, adaptability, tact and no clashes.

This policy is not surprising, because before it seems reasonable to evoke the Soviet designs on neighboring Pakistan, via Baluchistan and revolutionary Iran, one can wonder what is the Soviet Union looking for in this affair? To make Afghanistan into a satellite, of course, but, especially to "mongolize" the country calmly. "Mongolizing" which means to let them keep all the appearances of external and internal sovereignty in the same manner as was done in Mongolia, while reserving the privilege of military facilities (bases, missile emplacements) thanks to the support of the Marxist regime on the spot, a tactic which avoids proceeding with a pure and simple annexation. In a way an underhanded form of normalization. And which the armed opposition to the regime and to the Soviets seems hardly able to stop.

The guerrillas have every reason to fear the future. Not because these "guerilleros," the "Pachtounes," don't have the faith which sometimes moves mountains. They have it. As evidenced by the audaciously sudden and daring attack which allowed them to seize on Friday, but for how long, Faizabad, the capital of the province of Badakshan, manifested also by the disintegration of the Taraki and Amin regime, incapable of returning their coup.

But in the dust of the town of Peshawar, a Pakistani frontier town, situated at the foot of the Khyber Pass the rebel leaders are just running a store rather than a war council. About 60 religious and political trends have been counted, all incapable of uniting their efforts. "What we need," says a student from Kabul, "is a leader like Ho Chi Minh, who would bring us together and lead us to a real battle."

Over and above the divisions and poverty, there is a lack of assistance for this resistance. Not one petrodollar from the Gulf has fallen into their

cash-boxes. No Qadhdhati to pay cash for ultra-modern rocket-launchers which the Libyan chief distributes to all the liberation movements in the world. Not one favor from the CIA to change these "Pachtounes" into "dinamiteros." In their jihad, the holy war, declared against the "khafir," the infidel Marxists, the Islamic guerilleros, have nothing except a few shells for which they paid \$2.00 each. How many are there? They don't even know themselves; 50,000 or 90,000. The struggle seems doomed to failure. For two reasons. First, their weakness. As proof, last Thursday as, accompanied by other French newspapermen, we were going from Kabul to the Pakistan border, we met and passed a vehicle whose wind screens and body were riddled with bullets. Further on, near the city of Djalalabad, we arrived on a site where an ambush had taken place. About 200 Afghan soldiers were clearing the road. To oppose the Soviet armored cars the rebels had only been able to build a ridiculous barricade with some felled trees and the gravel of a river.

Second reason: Moscow's power. An example: the other day, in Kabul, dozens of trucks of the Russian engineer corps, were moving in the direction of the center and north of the country, carrying bridges and foot-bridges to cross fords and torrents. How to localize such a deployment of red army forces? If no one helps the guerrillas, one day, when the snow melts, the Badharakian, Nuristan and Kunar will probably never be considered as rebels. They will have been "normalized." No doubt, Marx will not have won any hearts, but God will have lost the battle.

7993

CSO: 4900

LAW ESTABLISHES MILITARY MEDICAL ACADEMY

Cairo AL-JARIDAH AL-RASMIYAH [THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE] in Arabic No 47,
22 Nov 79 pp 715-719

[Law No 57 for 1979 Establishing an Armed Forces Military Medical Academy]

[Text] In the name of the people
The president

The People's Council decided on the following law, which we have issued:

Chapter One
General Regulations

Article 1. A military medical academy is to be established as a legal entity reporting to the defense minister, with its headquarters in Cairo.

Article 2. The military medical academy's aim is to train and teach medical services officers of the armed forces various military medical specialties; provide specialization studies; and conduct follow-up, and encourage scientific and practical medical research in various military medical sciences and clinical medicine.

Article 3. The military medical academy consists of the following:

(A) Military Medical Institute:

Specializes in the sciences of organization and tactics of medical services, field surgery, field treatment, prophylaxis and the treatment of victims of destructive weapons, medical aid in the field and any other sciences.

(B) Health and Military Prophylaxis Institute:

Specializes in the sciences of military health, prophylaxis, contagious diseases and related prophylaxis and scientific research, environmental health, employee health and any other sciences.

(C) Military Marine Medical Institute:

Specializes in the sciences of marine medicine, deep sea medicine, diving, the study of health problems of the marine corp members and any other sciences.

(D) Military Aviation and Space Medical Institute:

Specializes in the science of aviation medicine and the development of space medicine.

(E) Higher Clinical Medical Studies Organization:

Controls the following educational sections in the major medical departments for the armed forces:

Al-Ma'adi Armed Forces Hospital
Kubri al-Qubbah General Military Hospital
Al-Hilmiyah General Military Hospital
Marine General Hospital
Aviation General Hospital
Ghamrah General Military Hospital
Alexandria Armed Forces Hospital
Military Hospital for Psychological Diseases
Military Hospital for Chest Diseases
Military Hospital for Contagious Diseases
Armed Forces Rehabilitation Center
Central medical factories and blood banks

(F) Any specialized medical institutes or other medical educational centers that are included in or established by a law issued by the president.

Article 4. The academy will be administered by:

- (A) The academy's supreme council
- (B) The academy's council

Each institute is administered by an institute council.

Each educational department in the major medical units for higher clinical studies is to be administered by a department board.

Article 5. The structure of the academy's supreme council is as follows:

Defense Minister-----President

Assistant defense minister specialized in therapeutic affairs
President of the Organization for Administration of the
Armed Forces
President of the organization for armed forces
supply and catering
Manager of the department of armed forces officer affairs
Manager of the department of armed forces medical services
President of the academy

} members

Five nonmilitary members who are qualified and experienced in the academy's work, appointed by a law issued by the defense minister for a 2-year period subject to renewal, provided one member represents the ministry of health and is chosen by the health minister, and the other represents the universities' supreme council chosen by this council among the teachers and doctors.

Vice President of the military academy-----Secretary

The council may invite to its sessions anyone who has helpful information or experience to discuss pertinent issues, but with no right to vote.

Article 6. The academy's supreme council meets upon the invitation of its president at least twice each year or each academic year, or whenever necessary.

The president specifies the subjects listed in his agenda. There is no quorum unless the majority of the council members are present. The council's discussions are confidential and laws are passed by majority a vote; in the case of a tie, the president will cast the deciding vote.

Article 7. The academy's supreme council specializes in the following:

- (A) Planning and drafting the general policies for the academy.
- (B) Suggesting any revision in the academy's organization.
- (C) Suggesting the establishment of new medical institutes that will report to the academy and confirming the general policies for institutional studies based on the suggestions of the academy's council.
- (D) Setting up general policies for scientific studies for the academy's faculty members based on suggestions by the academy's council.
- (E) Specifying the number of students for each academic year in every institute or educational hospital and the conditions of acceptance, based on the number suggested by the academy's council according to the academy's potential.
- (F) Granting educational degrees from the academy in military medicine, as recommended by its president.
- (G) Preparing by-laws for the organization of the academy and its work and the internal project by-laws for institutes and educational departments reporting to the academy, and executing any amendments related to these by-laws.
- (H) Looking into the subjects suggested by the defense minister or the president of the academy.

Article 8. The president of the academy shall offer the academy supreme council's decisions to the defense minister for approval. If the latter does not issue a law related to these decisions within 3 weeks from the date he receives them, they are considered effective.

Article 9. The structure of the academy's council is as follows:

Military Academy President-----President

Assistant defense minister specialized in training
Manager of the armed forces medical services department
Managers of the academy's institutes

Five Egyptian university professors who are qualified and experienced in the academy's work, appointed for 2 years subject to renewal by a law issued by the defense minister based on the recommendations of the academy's supreme council, after consultation with the university's supreme council and concerned parties.

members

Vice President of the Academy for Higher Clinical Medical Studies---Secretary

The council may invite to its sessions teachers of educational departments when subjects discussed involve their fields of specialization without granting them the right to vote.

The council meets by invitation from its president at least once a month or whenever the need arises. The council's president specifies the subjects of discussion for his agenda.

The council has a quorum only when a majority of its members attend. The council's discussions are confidential. Laws are issued by a majority of votes; in the case of a tie vote, the president's vote breaks the tie.

The internal by-laws define the council's specialties.

Article 10. The academy's president is appointed for a 3-year period which is renewable, by a decision of the defense minister. He administers the academy and facilitates its business, represents it in outside contacts and in legal matters, and is responsible for the execution of the general set policy to fulfill its goals. He is assisted by deputy presidents, and he is specifically responsible for the following:

(A) Supervising the preparation of study plans for the institutes and educational departments reporting to the academy according to the general study policy, and supervising and monitoring its execution and the facilitation of study.

(B) Nominating, or suggesting the transfer or termination of service of institute managers and academy faculty members.

(C) Preparing the academy's budget.

(D) Defining a plan and method to discuss research, holding educational study groups at the academy, and preparing a training program for faculty members.

The defense minister specifies the salary for the academy president, not to exceed 1,500 pounds per year.

The president of the academy is considered a full-time faculty member, and what applies to the faculty members in terms of bonuses and academy allowances applies to him also.

Article 11. Each institute or department in the educational medical units have a council that is formed and assigned specific duties by a decision of the defense minister based on the academy council's suggestions.

Article 12. The academy-related institute managers and the assistant president of the higher clinical medical academy are appointed by the defense minister, based on a nomination by the academy's president and the approval of the academy's council, and their specialities are defined according to the internal by-laws.

Article 13. The academy's funds are formed by the following:

- (A) Special academy funds in the state budget
- (B) Revenue from tasks and services performed by the academy
- (C) Loans
- (D) Donations and grants accepted by the academy's supreme council which do not conflict with its purposes.

Article 14. The academy will have a special budget similar to that of the general state budget. The academy's fiscal year begins and ends with the state's fiscal year.

Chapter Two Faculty Members

Article 15. The academy's faculty consists of the following:

- (A) Full-time members:
 - 1. Active armed forces physicians who are commissioned to work at the academy.
 - 2. Armed forces physicians who are requested to be retained to work at the academy.

3. Physicians with a specialization in academic sciences who apply for vacant faculty positions at the academy which have been advertised, and are then assigned as armed forces officers.

4. Civilian research personnel chosen from various scientific areas to work at the academy.

(B) Part-time civilian and military members who assist in teaching and research, whose degrees qualify them to hold faculty positions.

Article 16. Science positions on the academy's faculty are those of instructor, associate professor and professor.

It is required that a faculty member at the academy have a doctorate or equivalent degree in his special field from an Egyptian or accredited foreign university in compliance with the laws and regulations governing Egyptian universities; it is also required that he have a good reputation and conduct.

Article 17. It is required that any instructor meet the above conditions and that he be a graduate for at least 8 years.

Article 18. It is required that any associate professor meet the conditions stated in Article 16 and that he hold a doctorate or equivalent for at least 5 years, that he graduated at least 13 years previously and that his scientific achievements qualify him for this position.

Article 19. It is required that any professor meet the conditions stated in Article 16 and that at least 12 years have passed since he acquired his doctorate or equivalent, that he graduated at least 18 years previously, and that his scientific achievements qualify him for this position.

Article 20. Internal by-laws define for the academy, institutes and educational departments at major medical educational units reporting to it the other conditions required for anyone to be a member of its faculty.

Article 21. Special committees shall test the scientific production of the applicants for faculty positions mentioned in Articles 18 and 19 above.

It is required that members of these committees be academy professors or Egyptian university professors chosen by the academy's council.

A law is issued by the academy's president forming these committees, after approval by the academy's council.

Article 22. Working armed forces officers mentioned in Clause 1 of Article 15 who qualify for faculty positions in institutes and major educational medical units reporting to the academy are selected through commissioning by a law from the defense minister based on the academy council's recommendations.

Commissioning for these positions will be for a period of 3 years, and can be renewed upon suggestion by the academy's president with the approval of the academy's council.

Article 23. When necessary, the defense minister may, based on the academy council's suggestion, keep some of the military faculty members as full-time, salaried employees, as well as recall some of the officers who became full-time, salaried employees at the academy, provided the recall period is not less than 3 years, renewable. The recall or retention period may be terminated before the 3-year period is completed.

Bonuses for those who are retained or recalled are set according to Article 147 of Law 232 for 1959, which refers to the conditions of service and promotion of officers of the armed forces.

Article 24. The academy's president may, upon the academy council's agreement, commission civilian research personnel to full-time positions at the academy for a specified period. This commissioning is considered as a loan and is subject to loan arbitrations.

Article 25. Full-time and part-time military and civilian academy faculty members are given a teaching allowance of a maximum of 1,500 pounds for each semester. The conditions and regulations of spending this allowance are listed in the academy's by-laws.

Each full-time military or civilian faculty member is further given an academy allowance equal to 30 percent of the minimum military rank salary for officers and the minimum financial rank salary for civilians, in return for their administrative work in their divisions, supervising thesis preparations and continuing research.

The full-time military faculty members' eligibility for teaching and academy allowances, does not prevent them from receiving both in addition to all other compensations determined by the officers' service law.

Article 26. It is required that any appointed academy faculty member be an Egyptian national.

If necessary, qualified foreigners may be appointed to the faculty. Appointment and salary are to be based on a decision by the defense minister, based on the recommendations of the academy's council, for a renewable period of no more than 2 years.

Article 27. The academy pays the expenses of transferring the foreign faculty member and his family to his place of work and the expenses of his return upon his contract completion.

Article 28. At the end of his service at the academy, the foreign faculty member is given a bonus equivalent to 1 month's salary for each year of service. If he should die during his term of service, his heirs will be given the abovementioned bonus.

Article 29. The academy's by-laws define the conditions to be met by students of the academy's institutes and medical educational departments in the medical educational units.

Chapter Three Graduates

Article 30. Graduates of the military medical institute are granted military medical degrees as specified by the academy's by-laws and by a decision of the defense minister, based on the academy supreme council's recommendation.

Article 31. The by-laws define the rules upon which the registration of scientific these are to be based for those who have a master's degree in military medicine in order to get a doctorate in military medicine.

Science degrees in military medicine granted by the academy are equivalent to those granted at other Egyptian universities.

Chapter Four Conclusive Arbitration

Article 32. Except for faculty members, the state employment regulations for civil servants apply to all civilian employees at the academy.

The above-mentioned employees are commissioned by a decision of the academy's president. Civilian employees commissioned to work at the academy are granted a commissioning allowance equivalent to 30 percent of the basic salary they receive at their previous place of employment.

Article 33. A decision by the defense minister issues the by-laws and other laws and decisions necessary for the implementation of this law, based on the suggestions of the academy's supreme council.

Article 34. This law will be published in THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE and will be effective the day after its publication.

This law is sealed by the government's seal and is executed as one of its laws.

Issued by the president on 24 Dhu al-Hijjah 1399 (14 November 1979).

9455
CSO: 4802

LAW AMENDS PAY FOR MILITARY IN CIVILAIN JOBS

Cairo AL-JARIDAH AL-RASMIYAH [THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE] in Arabic, No 45
8 Nov 79 p 670

[Law No 49 for 1979 Amending Some Regulations of Law 232 for 1959 Regarding the Conditions of Service and Promotion for Officers of the Armed Forces]

[Text] In the name of the people
The president

The People's Council decided on the following law, which we issued:

Article One

The following text replaces the text in Article 149 of Law 232 for 1959 regarding the conditions of service and promotion for officers of the armed forces:

Article 149. In the event an officer is transferred to a civilian position, he is transferred to a civilian grade equivalent to his original military rank. His service date is the date when he acquired his military rank, unless the grade or position to which he is transferred is higher than that military rank, which will make his service date the date he acquired the lowest equivalent military rank. His seniority in either case should be no less than other coworkers with the same qualifications and graduation date at the location to which he was transferred.

The officer is considered transferred to the grade or civilian position equal to or higher than his military rank when one of his coworkers with the same qualifications and graduation date at the civilian position's location has been promoted to it. His service date in that position is the date of his promotion to it, taking into consideration that the military academy bachelor's degree is equivalent to the first qualified university degree.

The president of the republic may, by a decision from his office, transfer an officer to the original grade or position equivalent to the next higher military rank. His service date is that of his transfer.

The officer's pay for the position he is transferred to is determined according to the basic salaries he used to get in his military service plus permanent compensation awarded to his military rank or the salary determined for the position he is transferred to, whichever is greater.

The transferred officer can personally keep the difference between the fixed salary and compensation he earned in his military position issued by a decision of the defense minister and the total amount he earns in his civilian position, until this difference is resolved by a promotion, raise or compensation.

Article Two

Paragraph 4 of Article 149 written in Article One above of this law applies to the officers previously transferred to civilian positions and still in such positions until the date this law is published, with no right to receive retroactive pay differentials.

The decision regarding service dates in this law is also taken into consideration when defining the terms and amounts of fixed salaries involved in the adjustment of these officers' status.

Article Three

This law will be published in THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE and is effective on 26 May 1979.

This law is sealed by the government's seal and is executed as one of its laws.

Issued by the president on 2 Dhu al-Hijjah 1399 (23 October 1979)

9455

CSO: 4802

PROSECUTOR INVESTIGATES KOMITEH OCCUPYING U.S. EMBASSY

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 24 Jan 80 p 12

/Article: "Disclosure by Former Revolutionary Public Prosecutor Office Judges and Examining Magistrates on the Committee [Komiteh] Occupying the American Spy Nest"]

/Text/ Former examining magistrates and investigative judges of the Office of the Tehran Revolutionary Islamic Public Prosecutor have published a statement directed to Moslem students following the emam's path, in order to reveal the activities of agents of the dissolved Savak in the committee which is occupying the American spy nest. This statement declared that Jahangiri, Savak head of Gombad, has cooperated with the committee which has settled in the spy-house and has been interrogating revolutionaries.

The text of this statement is as follows:

As you can see these days with your own eyes, the murderous imperialists are preparing an incident and planning an act of treason every day, under the leadership of American imperialism, through the channel of domestic subjects. If the covert activity of these apostates and vermin is not exposed, their plotting will continue behind a veil of ambiguity. Exposure of this action in the worthy era of Emam Khomeyni will draw back the curtains of ignorance and naivete from the masses and the veil of fraud and duplicity from the reactionary hypocrites and the collusion of treason by black bestial agents.

Exposure is the repeated demand of the masses of the people; it has been reiterated on many occasions, and we are repeating it once again. We are opening the door of a connection with one of the most well-known of these conspiracies and insisently request that you steadfastly follow it, complete it and expose it.

In the early months of the revolution, when we were engaged in investigating and conducting examinations into the illegal committee which has established itself in the former American spy-house, people from the committee of the American embassy would go to Qasr Prison and the Office of the

Revolutionary Public Prosecutor and would sometimes sit for hours in the prosecutor's office and observe the comings and goings of prisoners and investigations on them.

When the revolutionary execution of the Zionist Elqanian, which was an object of pride within the Office of the Revolutionary Public Prosecutor during the period when we were present, took place, the Senate of American imperialism issued its declaration of condolences for Elqanian, and the people proceeded to march against the American Senate, the brotherhood of examining magistrates, in accordance with the duties of their beliefs, actively participated in the demonstrations. One of the brotherhood of examining judges cried out the slogans before the Palestinian Embassy and told all groups and officials, "Today your slogans must be against the American Senate and in defense of the revolutionary courts."

The reason why the brotherhood of examining magistrates took part in the demonstrations was that liberalism and reaction had mobilized themselves intensively against the Office of the Revolutionary Public Prosecutor. The executions of Hoveyda and Elqanian bothered them especially and, since the torrent of their recommendations could not break the dam of the examining magistrates' revolutionary will, they increased their pressure to liquidate us. Therefore it was necessary for us to address ourselves to the people themselves and to ask them for assistance. Those who wanted the revolutionary courts to become degraded from executing infidel emams to executing petty criminals raised deviationist slogans so that the issue of the Office of the Revolutionary Public Prosecutor would not be raised. When we reached the American Embassy, we noticed that deviationist slogans were being broadcast over the public address system. One brother told those in charge of the embassy, "Call for Hajj Masha'allah, head of the committee occupying the spy-house." After a while a car arrived with four passengers, driven by an American. Hajj Masha'allah, who was in that car, took our brother off to one side and said, "Speak quietly. What business have you got?" Our brother said, "We have come from the Office of the Revolutionary Public Prosecutor. Tell those who are carrying out the program not to make deviationist slogans. Today the slogans and demonstrations must be against the U. S. Senate and in defense of the revolutionary court and the execution of Ilqanian." Hajj Masha'allah brought our brother inside the embassy and said, "Tell that to the people who are carrying out the program themselves."

At that point Hajj Masha'allah, the American driver and a third person, who was the translator, left. Only one of the passengers, who had a bullhorn in hand, remained, and asked our brother "Why and from where have you come?" Our brother examining magistrate said, "I have come as I am, to see what is going on." A little time passed. Then Hajj Masha'allah Qassab's aide, that is, Hajj Ahmad, came and, pointing to the fourth passenger from the car, who was standing there, told our brother "See it's been 3 days and 3 nights that he's been livening the place up." At that point the examining magistrate, N, said "You must take him to the Public Prosecutor's Office".

Our brother the examining magistrate said, "What--isn't that Jahangiri? God forbid!"

Hajj Ahmad, with an oath and verse from the Koran, said "No, he is not Jahangiri, in God's name Jahangiri is being held prisoner in a room behind the American Embassy." The next morning, when our brother returned to the Office of the Public Prosecutor, on inquiring about Jahangiri's features, he realized that the fourth passenger in the car who had the bullhorn in hand was the same Jahangiri, head of Savak in Gombad.

Yes, in the era of the revolution, Jahangiri, the Savak agent and traitor, was running the demonstration for the people in front of the embassy. Brothers and sisters residing in the former spy-house, if you do not disclose this matter to the people, documents which have been obtained will bear witness to what we are saying. The heads and officials of Savak, who became super-revolutionaries after the revolution, are going to take over the powers of the people with the aid of their monopolistic and liberal connections and will even appear as candidates for the presidency. Yes, in a calculated fashion, they are bringing Jahagiri, head of Savak in Gombad and the man in charge of suppressing the people of Gombad, from the Office of the Revolutionary Public Prosecutor to the committee in the American Embassy, on the pretext that they want to arrest Savak agents through him, so the American Embassy can become a hiding place for Savak agents and a center for conspiracies against the revolution and revolutionaries. For this reason, one day they brought an order from Mr Hadavi, the first general revolutionary public prosecutor, and said "We want Jahangiri so that he can help arrest Savak agents." Then it later became known that that was to capture and torture revolutionaries, not Savak agents, and plot against the revolution. Thus they snatched Ezzatollah Jahangiri, head of Savak in Gombad, away from the grasp of the Office of the Public Prosecutor. When the members of the Office of the Revolutionary Public Prosecutor who were finally liquidated because of their vigilance and refusal to go along understood that the Savak head of Gombad really was going around inside the American Embassy and conspiring, his examiner was asked where Jahangiri was and it became known that they had taken him to the American spy-house several days before on orders of the general revolutionary public prosecutor. A prison official, informed of this fact, said "Right now the news has come in that Jahangiri is going about freely inside the American Embassy." What has been going on? Our brother examining magistrate pursued the matter. He telephoned the embassy to tell Hajj Masha'allah to bring Jahangiri to prison immediately. The call was cut off and a quarter of an hour later Hajj Ahmad, Hajj Masha'allah Qassab's assistant, went to the Office of the Public Prosecutor and said "What have you got to do with Jahangiri?" The brother examining magistrates said "We have several questions to ask him." However, Hajj Ahmad, Hajj Masha'allah's assistant, said "No, Jahangiri must stay right where is, we also have business with him." When our brother became more insistent, Hajj Ahmad got in touch with Mr Hadavi and said "We need Jahangiri." Hadavi, the general revolutionary public prosecutor, told him to telephone the examining magistrate

and then told our brother, "Jahangiri is inside the embassy." Our brother insisted "Jahangiri, the Savak head of Gombad, has to go to prison because we have business with him and an order has been given by the higher revolutionary public prosecutor, who is higher in rank, that you have nothing to do with this activity." In this manner, the case ended and Hajj Ahmad also hung up. Yes, brothers and sisters resident in the spy-house, Ezzatollah Jahangiri, the Gombad Savak chief, the one responsible for all the acts of treason and crimes against the people of Gombad, and the other Jahangiris, have been snatched away in this fashion from the grip of the Office of the Revolutionary Public Prosecutor and, as you have been told, we were liquidated in the Office of the Revolutionary Public Prosecutor and obtained no information about Jahangiri until we learned that they had let him escape. From where? From the illegal committee established in the American spy-house.

However, the people of Iran must be told why the case of the suspension of the American Embassy committee was reviewed in secret. Who would be damaged if it were brought into the open? To whose detriment, and to whose advantage, was it that they hid from the eyes of the great people of Iran and gave no explanations regarding it?

They have not said who established the American Embassy committee and what the several months' agenda of these people was.

It would be fitting for you to know that insolence and conspiracy are bringing things to the point where Hajj Masha'allah Qassab, head of the American Embassy committee, also has been going to the emam via Mr J.R. and Mr J.R. has been telling the emam "I am the brother of so-and-so and this man is Hajj Masha'allah, the man in charge of the American Embassy committee. I am requesting you (the emam) to write on a piece of paper that Hajj Masha'allah should go back to his work." The emam declared, "This has nothing to do with me." The intermediary insisted, "I am the brother of so-and-so who always was standing in your house in Paris and I myself was active in the past," and repeated his request. The emam, refusing to go along, categorically repeated, "no." The intermediary insisted and still hasn't got any results.

Combative sisters and brothers residing in the former American spy-center! We have begun and have looked into the matter up to this point. The rest is up to you--in fact it is not up to you, it is your duty, it is the duty of people with a revolutionary mind. We have also previously said that these documents do not concern a special group and clique--they have been bought by the flood of tens of thousands of martyrs, the blood of those who have disappeared and been tortured over the past 50 years, and they belong to each individual in the nation. The nation is gradually expressing your revolutionary work in the same harmonious fashion with which you are and have been in opposition.

We request you categorically and urgently to reveal the secret, mysterious and conspiracy-packed story of the committee established in the American Embassy, Hajj Masha'allah Qasseb who had links with the CIA organization's espionage chief, name of Mr Charles Moss, in the American Embassy (who presently is among the hostages and led them), and even of the more basic personnel who are involved in this relationship, and we request that you brook no delay. We will not become weary of insisting, writing and speaking. Do not become tired, either, of making revolutionary, Islamic revelations, and do not allow the suspension to occur. The subject of the embassy committee can show the people of the world the direct intervention of the CIA and America in our destiny.

If there are documents concerning the relationship with the American embassy committee--and there are--reveal them as soon as possible so that our heroic people may be put in the mainstream of these complicated conspiracies and so that world public opinion may be enlightened as well and may become informed and experienced, so that they will not take naive decisions and so that they will be alert from the political standpoint. Meanwhile, if this enigma and this unanswered question being presented to the people of the world concerning this relationship is answered, if these spies are arrested and tried and severely punished, traitors will no more incite acts of treason, espionage and conspiracy with an open spirit.

11887

CSO: 4906

PROSECUTION OF FORQAN GROUP GETS UNDERWAY

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 24 Jan 80 p 9

/Article: "Secret Trial of the Head and Members of the Forqan Group Has Started"/

/Text/ Yesterday morning the trial of the head and members of the Forqan group began in the capital revolutionary Islamic court. The capital Islamic revolutionary court's verdict on the members of this group will be announced soon.

The trial of the members of the Forqan group is taking place in secret. In connection with the trial of the leader and members of the Forqan group, Hojjatoleslam Ali Qoddusi, the general revolutionary public prosecutor, issued a statement whose text is as follows:

As our honored brothers and sisters are aware, the Forqan group, at the dawn of our compatriots' freedom and deliverance from the suffocating, strangling era of the corrupt regime, began unremitting efforts, by the orders of its fanatical masters, to create an atmosphere of terror and panic. To this end, in a cowardly manner, it steeped its hands in the blood of scholars and beloved persons. Following these incidents or provocative assassination, our honored brothers and sisters, while stating frankly that this matter would not create the slightest disruption in the national will, demanded most speedily and emphatically that these agents be punished.

However, since the matter of rendering judgment, which is the greatest responsibility, especially in an Islamic system, requires the completion of files and evidence of crime, and since on the other hand a hasty trial on matters which will result in the execution of a murderer will weaken the case against those cooperating with the accused group, the revolutionary courts, while having had some of the accused persons at their disposal for months, consider that precipitous action would be improper, in spite of the insistence and pressure of fellow citizens and families of the martyrs. Now, with the care of God and the unremitting toil of the young men who have truly dedicated all their time, spirit and leisure to the revolution

in this activity, one must say, especially after the successes of the night of 24 December 1979, that 90 percent of this group's work has been completed. Therefore, the revolutionary court began the trial of several members of the group yesterday and the court's final verdict will be conveyed to the public as soon as possible.

/Signed/ The general public prosecutor of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ali Qoddusi.

This morning, through contacts we had with the capital Islamic revolutionary court, one member of the court in secret told KEYHAN's correspondent that the trial of this group began the previous day and that the court's verdict on the members of this group would soon be declared.

Telephone Call by Someone Considering Himself a Leader of Forqan

Yesterday afternoon an unknown person who was probably talking from a public telephone contacted KEYHAN. This person, who presented himself as "one of the leaders of the Forqan group," said "I am warning that if Akbar Gudarzi, the leader of the group, is executed, a flow of blood will be started."

He said "My alias in the Forqan group is P. S. Tozro.

"Write down this sentence: '52 channels--the basic link.' Everyone will recognize me--I mean, all members of the Forqan group."

This person added, "I now have a hand grenade and Uzi sub-machine gun with me. In yesterday (the day before yesterday)'s skirmish I intervened with the committee officials and tonight I will become one of the biggest personalities in the country."

He ended his telephone conversations by uttering this sentence "The seal is in my hand."

11887

CSO: 4906

IRAN

ESFAHAN COMMITTEES MERGE WITH GUARDS IN PEACE MOVE

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 5 Jan 80 p 4

[Excerpt] Following merger of the committees and the guards, the 23-day long sit-in of Esfahan committees demanding dissolution of the city's 13 committees came to an end.

A statement issued by Dr Mohammad Javad Bahonar, representative of Imam Khomeyni and the revolutionary council, who had been in Esfahan for some time to study various problems, announced the forthcoming merger of the committees and the guards. The statement also said:

At this moment when the nation is in the midst of its struggle against American imperialism and is approaching its presidential elections, it is necessary that all people, in every level, remain alert in trying to preserve the fruits of the revolution and do every effort in their service to Islam and in the furthering of the aims of the revolution. In view of the fact that the honorable people of Esfahan had played a major role in the revolution as well as in the post-revolutionary era, and in view of the fact that there had been some problems and causes for concern in certain organs (of the revolution) recently, it was necessary to act and remove them immediately so that people of Esfahan could continue their valuable coordinated and sincere services. With that in mind, the great leader of the revolution ordered immediate centralization of Esfahan's revolutionary and military forces. In addition, as representative of the revolutionary council I was ordered to study the situation in cooperation with various organs and the esteemed religious leaders of Esfahan which resulted in the following decisions which will be put into effect as of Friday 4 Dey 1358 [25 Jan 80]:

1. Arrangements have been made for the protection of the clergy, as well as, people in every level and various groups and organizations, against attacks and efforts aimed at creating division and public incitement so that religious groups, radio and television and other organizations and propaganda apparatus could continue their Islamic revolutionary function and be able to preserve their unity and solidarity against visible and invisible plots.

2. In view of the fact that according to article 150 of the constitution the Guardian Corps is a permanent institution, responsible for order in the Islamic Republic, every effort should be made to strengthen it and make it violation-free. Central Council of the guardians' corps command in Tehran will dispatch its representatives, with full authority, to Esfahan to work out the details in consultation with local authorities and religious leaders.

3. For unification and centralization purposes, all the armed forces of the revolutionary council of Esfahan and its branches will merge in the guardian corps. The merger will be supervised by a temporary council made up of two members each of the corps, the committee and the revolutionary council each. In the merger, all faithful and qualified elements in the committees will be taken into the corps.

4. The corps will be responsible for keeping order in the city in cooperation with gendarmerie and the police.

5. All revolutionary organs and official institutions such as the guardian corps, revolutionary court, reconstruction, housing and others will strictly function within their own legal authorities and any action beyond that will be considered as violation of the law. In the meantime, those in charge of (the head offices) these institution in the capital will be requested to, in cooperation with religious leaders and local authorities, study the workings of the above-mentioned institutions and improve their efficiency.

6. Representatives of various organs will end their sit-in strike at the governor's office and are prepared to continue their Islamic and social services with full understanding and revolutionary alertness.

Various groups and the struggling people of Esfahan are requested to continue, faithfully and in solidarity, their efforts of serving Islam and the Islamic nation.

9561

CSO: 4906

IRAN

NAMES OF 106 CANDIDATES FOR PRESIDENT ANNOUNCED

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 5 Jan 80 p 3

[Text] Following publication of the statement by Imam Khomeyni leaving voters free to choose and confirm presidential candidates, the Ministry of Interior announced the names of 106 out of 124 people who had officially announced their candidacy. These included the names of people such as Massud Rajavi, a leader of the People's Mojahedin Organization and that of doctor Hassan Ayat, a central committee member of the Islamic Republic Party.

In a related announcement by the Ministry of the Interior it was noted that the names of 18 people had been dropped from the list of candidates due to either having had past connections with SAVAK and the old regime or because of their criminal records or age qualification.

Appearance of two new names on the list indicate that positions of certain groups had changed. The list also contains the names of Sheykh Sadaq Khalkhali and Sheykh Mostafa Rahnema who had earlier withdrawn their candidacy in favor of other candidates.

The inclusion of Massud Rajavi's name in the list is an indication that the People's Mojahedin Organization had decided to enter the race after the leader of the revolution had turned down its suggestion to run for president. It is expected that the People's Mojahedin Organization will formally announce Rajavi's candidacy within the next few days.

It is also expected that doctor Hassan Ayat, in charge of the political affairs of the Islamic Republic Party will withdraw from the race in favor of Jalaleddin Farsi. In his talks with the KEYHAN newspaper sometime ago he himself had suggested Farsi as candidate for president.

Following is the official statement issued by the Ministry of Interior regarding candidates, with the omission of 18 names from the list:

In the name of God the compassionate, the merciful. In view of the statement by Imam Khomeyni giving voters the freedom to choose their candidates for president in the nation's first presidential elections the Ministry of Interior of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in accordance with Article 115 of the constitution and in view of article 3 of election laws for the first president of the republic, the names of 106 candidates for president are as follows:

1. Seyyed Hadi Ayatollahzadeh-Qomi
2. Abdol Rasul Masihi-Dam
3. Seyyed Kazem Emami-Razavi
4. Hassan Janab Zadeh
5. Mohammad Qobad Mo'tamedi
6. Mohammad Rahim Qassemi
7. Taqi Dorostian
8. Daryush Hudegam
9. Habib Iranli
10. Arastu Meqnat
11. Kazem Mehrabanpur
12. Davud Maleki Nazif
13. Hossyn Bartun
14. Mohammad Hosseyn Javaherian
15. Abolhassan Moravej
16. Se'adat Assadi Habib
17. Mohammad Ali Firuzinia
18. Abdolreza Mo'aven
19. Bani Showkat Purlotfi
20. Mohammad Ebrahim Karami
21. Yahya Forutan
22. Ali Akbar Davar
23. Nasrollah Kholdi Naji
24. Seyyed Sadeq Taqavi
25. Parviz Edalatmanesh
26. Mohammad Ebrahim Hassanpur
27. Javad Qadimi
28. Mohammad Javad Ashjarian
29. Mohammad Ali Haqir
30. Seyyed Mansur Mirahmadi Asl
31. Siavosh Mahmudi
32. Ebrahim Mirzai
33. Ali Ahmad Irani
34. Ziaeldin Majid-Sheybani
35. Mohammad Hassan Valdan
36. Morteza Qadavi
37. Kazem Sami
38. Nasrollah Nowzohar
39. Amir Khorshid Zahrai
40. Mehdi Baqer Turchehormi Sorkhani
41. Sha'ban Rajab Tavusi

42. Manucheher Eskandari
43. Seyyed Mohammad Sadrnia
44. Hamid Moheb Erangheh
45. Seyyed Abdolhosseyn Mosavi
46. Hossein Qoli Rais Qasemi
47. Shokr Khoda Aran
43. Mohammad Mosavi Va'ez
49. Iraj Kashkuli
50. 'Abbas Shahin Javi
51. Rahim Bani Asad
52. Farajollah Afshar
53. Masha'ollah Talachian
54. Mohammad Ali Mohammadi Dust
55. Davar Salehnejad Khoshabi
56. Seyyed Ahmad Madani
57. Abutaleb Riahi
58. Gholam Reza Arbabi
59. Hosseyn 'Ali Kuhsar Khameneh
60. Qodratollah Jamalpur
61. Mahmud Seyrafizadeh
62. Ahmad Haritash
63. Seyyed Hamid Seyfzadeh
64. Zabihollah Soleymannejad
65. Soleyman Siassi
66. Seyyed Javad Mosavi-Khalkhali
67. Jalal Farsi
68. Seyyed Hassan Ayat
69. Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr
70. Ali Asghar Zare'i
71. Ali Asghar Hosseynian
72. Mehdi Nikmorad
73. Karambakhsh Dowlatbeh
74. Seyyed Javad Faqihi-Hosseynabadi
75. Gholamhossein Samari
76. Mohammad Ali Baqeri
77. Mohammad Moqadasi
78. Sadeq Sadeq Banki
79. Jabbar Seyyedzadeh
80. Nureddin Qoreyshi
81. Mohammad Sadeq Khalkhali
82. Mohammad Taqi Akbareyn
83. Bozorg Taqi Sangdehi
84. Mansur Tabesh
85. Khalil Azar
86. Daryush Foruhar
87. Hosseyn Lankarani
88. Amir Hushang Shams Mostafa
89. Parviz Karimpanahi

90. Javad Zia Qazvini
91. Sadeq Qotbzadeh
92. Parviz Basiri
93. Hassan Arfaian
94. Seyyed Ahmad Seyyedi
95. Ahmad Mas'udi
96. Mohsen Baqerzadeh Rafsanjani
97. Mohammad Baqer Hekmatnia
98. Jan Mohammad Eramian
99. Hamid Qazian
100. Ahmad Sheykholtayefeh
101. Safar Ali Khalili
102. Hassan Ebrahim Habibi
103. Mohammad Sadeq Tabatabai
104. Mas'ud Rajavi
105. Mostafa Rahnema
106. Mohammad Mokri

Names of 18 candidates were dropped from the list for reasons such as SAVAK membership, identification card and age problems, as well as previous violations with the law. Specific reasons for dropping these names from the list, could be announced through the mass media at the request of the individuals whose names were dropped.

Candidates for the president are hereby asked to either report personally or send their representatives to the office of the commission for overseeing campaign for elections at 5 p.m. on Sunday 16 Dey 1358 [6 January 80] located at Jam-e-Jam Avenue to be present for the allocation of the radio-television campaign time to various candidates. Absence of candidates will be considered as their lack of willingness to take advantage of the offer.

Election Events

Ayatollah Sheykh Sadeq Khalkhali announced today that due to present exceptional conditions he continues to remain as candidate for the presidency. The statement issued by Khalkhali noted that he had intended to withdraw his candidacy but that due to the present artificial chaotic conditions created by the paid agents of the United States and international Zionism he will continue to remain in the race.

Society of Teachers of Theology in Qom has announced its support of Jalaleddin Farsi. The text of the announcement is as follows: In the name of God the merciful. Now that, by the grace of God, the rightful struggle of the Moslem people of Iran, under the leadership of His Eminence Ayatollah Khomeyni, is nearing final victory and the people of Iran, for the first time in its history of several thousand years, can freely go to the polls to vote for a president, the Society of Teachers of Theology in Qom, which has in the past tried to carry out its divine duty alongside the struggling

Moslem people of the country, is also taking part in this fateful period of history. It has, after several sessions and hours of discussions, and with due respect to all those who are preparing themselves for this vital task, overwhelmingly voted to support Jalaledin Farsi who has had a long record in the field of education, the Islamic struggle and in the following of the Imam's line. We support his candidacy for the president of the Islamic Republic hoping that the people of Iran will carry out its vitally important Islamic duty at this important crossroad of history so that, by the grace of God, true Islamic rule could prevail in Iran and throughout the world. All other accounts published in the press previously have not been final decisions.

Sadeq Qotbzadeh has joined those presidential candidates who have campaign headquarters. In this connection the following statement has been issued from his campaigning headquarters: Sadeq Qotbzadeh's central campaign headquarters has now been opened. We are looking forward for guidance and assistance by all those who love Islam and support the Islamic republic and are looking for the completion of the presidential elections in an Islamic and humanistic manner. This campaigning headquarters asks all those willing to give whatever help they could in the electing of Sadeq Qotbzadeh to get in touch with us by telephone. The numbers to reach are: 627471, 627054 and 627047. The address is: Park Avenue (previously Ministers), 8th Avenue, No 6.

Doctor Sayyed Ahmad Madani, another presidential candidate, has resigned his post as commander of the country's naval forces.

Eng Hushang Kordestani, in charge of the National Front in Gilan, announced at a gathering in the National Front's center in Gilan he will support Doctor Madani. He said: The National Front in Gilan has suggested to the Central Council of the Front in Tehran that in view of not having put forward a candidate of its own to give its backing to Doctor Madani both because of his being a strong and national figure and for having been a member of the National Front's central council. In the meantime, an announcement issued by the campaign headquarters of Doctor Madani stated that the Bakers' Guild of city of Tehran and the suburbs and writers and reporters of the Tehran and Kerman press have come out in support of Doctor Madani's candidacy.

The public relations section of the campaign headquarters of Daryush Foruhar put out his biographical sketch. According to the biography Foruhar was born in Esfahan in 1307 [21 Mar 28-20 Mar 29] and completed his elementary school education there. He entered politics early in life and was arrested in 1321 [21 Mar 42-20 Mar 43] by the British occupation force and sent to exile. He met Mossadeq in 1322 [21 Mar 43-20 Mar 44] and five years later formed a nationalistic group while attending the faculty of law in Tehran. He later joined Mossadeq and was wounded in the coup d'etat of 1332 [1953] and went into hiding. He was imprisoned in 1335 [21 Mar 56-20 Mar 57]. Two years later began the publication of ARMAN-E MELLAT (The Will

of the Nation). In 1343 [13 Mar 64-20 Mar 65], when Imam Khomeyni left for abroad, Foruhar was imprisoned once again. His biography details his activities up until the Islamic revolution led by Imam Khomeyni.

As was reported earlier, various groups continue to announce their support for Bani-Sadr every day. According to his campaign headquarters 79 different groups have so far announced their support for his candidacy.

During a session at Doctor Hassan Habibi's campaign headquarters yesterday it was announced he was ready for a television debate to defend his announced program and policy.

Following is the address of Doctor Tabatabai's campaign headquarters: Takht-e Tavus Avenue, 93 Sohravardi, Tel No 844466.

In a telephone call to KEYHAN, Kazem Emami Razavi, a presidential candidate, told the paper that in accordance to the equal campaign practices all candidates must resign [from positions they now hold] and has already asked the Islamic Revolutionary Council to take action.

9561

CSO: 4906

DEVELOPMENT AID NOW EXPECTED IN RETURN FOR OIL

Paris LE MONDE in French 3 Jan 80 p 3

[Article by Brigitte Gros, senator at large, mayor of Meulan: "Return to Tehran"]

[Text] "In Iran everything is difficult, nothing is impossible." So goes a Persian saying and with a lot of truth we felt, as my fellow deputies, Pierre-Alexandre Bourson and Nicolas About and I carried out our three-person mission to Tehran and Qom. If the dialog we proposed to the leader of the Islamic Revolution and the members of the Revolutionary Council was finally acknowledged possible and even begun, it was probably because as the French deputies from Yvelines, department of Neauphle-le-Chateau, Ayatollah Khomeyni's residence before he returned to his country, we were thus privileged spokespersons.

We had the feeling that we had succeeded in drawing the attention of the persons we met with to our position on several questions we had particularly taken to heart. We expressed to them our conviction and our partisanship of peaceful solutions to current tensions, in opposition to confrontations and provocations.

The first question we took up with them was, of course, respect for international law and the universally accepted rules for relations between nations. Thus we expressed our hope that as a first gesture towards detente the hostages now being held at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran would be freed. Our hosts, doubtless because this request was presented by elected representatives of Neauphle-le-Chateau and expressed in terms of French public opinion, listened with interest, some clearly sharing this point of view.

To be sure, the decisions we impatiently awaited, by Christmas or by New Year's, have not yet materialized. But we still hope that Iran will take the path of respecting diplomatic immunity.

The second question we took up in Tehran, concerned new economic relations between Iran and Europe: on one side a country rich in raw materials and energy sources, but underequipped and underindustrialized, on the other hand a highly industrialized community of nations poor in energy resources. On this level our dialog seemed fruitful, the ministers concerned showing particular interest in establishing new kinds of relationships between their country and the Community. They even affirmed to us that they hoped the 1985 development plan, now in preparation, would succeed in associating Iran, Europe and Japan outside the two superpowers.

The present leaders of the Islamic Revolution no longer want to sell their oil, that precious material, for money, whether expressed in dollars, francs, or marks, or for investments that cannot assure stable and progressive revenues. This is why Iran now refuses to sell its "black gold" to the community on traditional financial terms it considers outmoded. In exchange for oil, they are asking the industrial countries to provide men and machinery as a means to development. Iran has set itself the double goal of creating at the same time the road and port facility infrastructure it so gravely lacks and to construct its own production plants, beginning with electricity generation centers and petrochemical complexes designed to manufacture oil products on the spot. To do this, French engineers, technicians and production managers will be welcomed.

Agriculture engineers are also sought in the context of a new type of technical assistance, who will make possible exploitation of 40 million hectares now lying fallow. Iran wants to develop its agriculture so that it will no longer depend on imports for 80 percent of its cereals. The development of this new kind of assistance is already being viewed favorably by leaders of various French firms in Iran with whom we met under the auspices of the Franco-Iranian Chamber of Commerce. They affirmed they hoped to continue to participate in the development of this country. This is why they are impatiently awaiting the necessary political negotiations to be raised. In effect, as long as Iran does not decide to respect international law, how can the industrial countries establish on a basis of confidence and stability, fruitful relationships and associations not only on technical and industrial levels, but also on the level of personnel? France, along with Germany and England, hopes their nationals now working in this country will be able to stay and even be joined by others.

Thus we were able to establish the point that rapid and stable development of new relationships between the oil producing countries and the industrialized countries is desirable and desired, and why this development can become a common goal. But today it is obscured by the detention of hostages in an embassy.

We were able to establish that the Iranian revolution is a reality, that it expresses the sufferings of a population too long held in misery and oppression under the authoritarian regime of the Shah. This is why we want to keep on believing that this young revolution will find the way to association with nations who want to preserve peace in the world and understanding between peoples in the context of a new world political and economic order.

8860

CSO: 4900

KHOMAYNI REVOLUTION LACKS EXPORT APPEAL

Athens ATHENS NEWS in English 30 Jan 80 p 5

[Article by T. D. Allman]

[Text] Ankara--Iran's Islamic Revolution is proving to be a far less exportable commodity than its oil. The Ayatollah Khomeyni has widened the gap between his brand of Islam and that practised elsewhere, rather than inspiring any kind of Islamic ecumenical or political movement in other countries.

The primary reason for the parochial, as opposed to catholic appeal of Khomeyni's Islam is the doctrinal fragmentation within the religion itself.

Iran is the world's only overwhelmingly Shi'ite Muslim nation. All its neighbours, except Iraq, are predominantly Sunni. Islam in Iran tends to be fiercely independent of secular authority, even though Khomeyni as the religious leader virtually runs the country.

In other Muslim countries Islam is usually financially dependent on the secular government, and in no position to challenge, let alone supplant it. In Syria and Egypt, for example, the Muslim clergy are paid by the state. Here in Turkey, the chief religious official is a government civil servant who controls both spiritual appointments and the pursestrings.

Under Khomeyni, moreover, the state religion is not Islam, nor even Shi'ism, but Khomeyni's particular brand of Shi'ism. For Sunni Muslims, both inside and outside Iran, the ascendancy of that new faith is alarming.

While the Islamic Republic guarantees the religious and political rights of Iran's tiny Jewish, Christian and Zoroastrian minorities, it is much less clear about the rights of Sunni Muslims who make up about ten percent of Iran's population and the vast majority of the Muslim world.

The Islamic Republic has, in fact, shown that Iran is not only a very unusual Muslim country, but is unique.

While in most of the Muslim world Islam established itself well before the development of a nation state, in Iran the process was the exact reverse. Iran was a powerful empire with an established national identity a thousand years before the Prophet was born.

The Iranians did not so much convert to a foreign religion, Islam, as they transformed it from a universal religion into a creed as distinctly nationalistic in many ways as the Orthodox Church in Russia or the Anglican faith in England. Historians have referred to the process as the "Iranian conquest of Islam."

The result is that to highly orthodox Muslims in countries like Saudi Arabia, and to highly secularised Muslims in countries like Turkey, Islam as it is practised in Iran appears much more idiosyncratically Iranian than an example of their own faith at work.

Many Saudis, for example, believe the Koran unequivocally prohibits pictorial presentation of any kind-- ranging from paintings to television. But the Iranians, with their long, pre-Islamic tradition of fine arts, discarded that interpretation centuries ago.

Today, Iran is festooned with millions of paintings and photographs of Khomeyni--something a devout Saudi finds as heretical as a conservative Catholic would find rock and roll music being played at an ecumenical mass.

And while Khomeyni's orthodoxy offends Muslims who believe in separation of church and state in countries like Turkey and Egypt, the Ayatollah's emphasis on social and economic equality disturbs the conservatives.

Has the Islamic revolution had a domino effect anywhere? Judging from visits I have made to a number of Iran's Muslim neighbours, few believe Khomeyni's revolution provides a useful model for their countries. As one prominent Turkish politician recently remarked: "Even if Khomeyni were giving away Islamic Revolution free, he would not find many takers among us Turks."

There have been suggestions that Turkey might be the next Middle East country most likely to be "the next Iran," but after extensive travels in Turkey I can confirm that politician's view.

Turkey has severe problems, as many of Iran's neighbours do. But even those Turks who want revolutionary change tend toward extreme-right and left-ideologies deriving from Marxism and Fascism, not Islam. As for Turkey's disaffected minorities, Khomeyni's internal policies have destroyed whatever appeal the Islamic revolution might have had for them. One sees signs reading "Killer Khomeyni" in Kurdish villages all over eastern Turkey.

When Yasser Arafat, chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), made a triumphal visit to Teheran shortly after the Shah fell, some feared

a volatile fusion of Palestinian guerrillas, Iranian petro-dollars and Islamic faith. But while the Palestinians are delighted at Iran's repudiation of the Shah's pro-Israeli policies, PLO officials in Beirut make it clear they do not see Khomeyni's policies as relevant models for economic or political development.

"When you are as big and rich as Iran," one high-ranking Palestinian observed, "maybe you can act out Koranic fantasies. When you are weak and poor like us you have to be realistic. All we want is a secular state of our own, like everybody else, not the kingdom of God on earth."

Iran's two eastern neighbours--Afghanistan and Pakistan--were deeply divided long before the Shah fell. Pakistan's military ruler, General Zia-ul Haq, has attempted to use Islam to provide a sense of unity and purpose. But Pakistan in no sense has undergone an Islamic revolution; power remains firmly in the hands of the military--not the Muslim laity or clergy, as in Iran.

In Afghanistan, the Soviet-supported, left-wing government is in deep trouble with the country's conservative and fiercely independent tribesmen, but not because of Iran. Afghan guerrillas are all Sunnis--and they are rebelling against social programs, ranging from sweeping land reform to the elimination of feudal privilege.

Iran's Islamic revolution, in fact, has had a significant effect in only one other notice so far--Iraq, the only other country where Shi'ites form a substantial part of the population.

But whatever hopes the Islamic revolution had aroused among Iraq's Shi'ites and discontented minorities by now have been crushed--not only by Khomeyni, but by Iraq's own repressive government. Last summer, Iraq's new president executed virtually the entire Shi'ite wing of his own Baathist party, in the course of what resembled an internal power struggle much more than an attempted religious revolution.

Iran's Islamic revolution has been contained, then, by Iran's distinct national characteristics.

The major beneficiary of this curtailment outside Iran is Russia, for which a spreading Islamic revolution could have created a threat much more immense than any it posed either to its other neighbours or to the United States. Six of the Soviet Union's 15 republics have majority Muslim populations and one of them--Azerbaijan--has a majority Shi'ite population.

But Khomeyni's failure to grant autonomy to Iran's Turkoman minority has limited whatever appeal the Islamic revolution might have had in Central Asia. And in Russia the winedrinking, secularised Soviet Azerbaijanis,

who enjoy mixed bathing on their own Caspian beaches, seem unimpressed by Khomeyni's puritanism.

Iran, in the end, has not had an Islamic revolution so much as it has had an "Iranian Shi'ite revolution." Using the Koran, Khomeyni has wound up demonstrating what others did with the Bill of Rights and the collective works of Karl Marx--that while the philosophers propose, nationalism disposes, remaining the single most powerful force in the world today.

CSO: 4920

BRIEFS

FORQAN MEMBERS SEIZED--With the arrest of three members of the military staff of the Forqan group, the assassination of Dr Bahonar remains unconsummated. In connection with the arrest of this group, the Army of Guards of the Islamic Revolution in the capital issued a statement. The text of the capital Army of Guards of the Islamic Revolution statement, which has come into the possession of KEYHAN newspaper, is as follows: "Yesterday evening at 2000 hours, when three members of the basic military staffs, one of whom was the top military man in the Forqan group, were preparing to meet with one another, they were attacked after a chase of about 45 minutes by one of the operations units. These people, despite statements by the guards, resisted and in the course of the arrest Vafa Qazizadeh, who had the job of driving terrorists in the Motahhari staff, was wounded around the neck. He was immediately taken to Imam Khomeyni Hospital. Doctors' efforts to save him continued to morning, but he died." Further in the Army of Guards' statement, it was declared that "In the course of an examination into the persons arrested, the house of another Forqan group team was discovered, situated in the former Sepah Avenue. At 2200 hours as the members of the army were going there to empty out the house and transfer the equipment and materials present, they met armed resistance by people in the house. Fortunately none of the shots were on target and even a hand grenade which they threw at the army members did not explode. In this incident, one of the three people residing in this house was wounded in the hand and everyone was arrested. Meanwhile, in the course of the investigation, these people confessed to their participation in the crimes committed by the group and the plan for the assassination of Hojjatoleslam Mohammad Javad Bahonar, which was on their agenda for the purpose of weakening the people's morale and establishing a presence after the disastrous strikes of recent days, was revealed by the army; we have mentioned this matter in a separate statement." In the conclusion of this statement, it was said that "Meanwhile these persons admitted to the theft of more than 1 million tomans on 19 January from the Abbasabad Branch of the National Bank. Thus, with the arrest of these members, one of the revolution's last devastating strikes has been delivered to the rotten body of this group." /Text/ /Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 24 Jan 80 p 9/ 11887

MONTAZERI REPRESENTATIVE AHMED AL-SADIKI COMMENTS ON IRANIAN VOLUNTEERS

Beirut L'ORIENT-LE JOUR in French 15 Dec 79 pp 1,15

[Text] Considered by the Lebanese rulers to be shelved, the affair of the Iranian "volunteers" for Southern Lebanon has experienced a new resurgence in Beirut itself: in a press conference, a representative of the "Revolutionary Organization of the Masses of the Islamic Republic," Ahmed Al-Sadiki, thought he could announce the coming "in the coming days" of the first contingent of Iranian soldiers, the same ones who were held up for several days at the Tehran airport. Their arrival in Southern Lebanon, he emphasized, will be made public, either by Beirut or Damascus.

Sadiki, who claims to have arrived in Lebanon 48 hours ago, refused to say specifically how he entered the country, stating moreover that Syria had issued a "collective visa" to the first contingent of Iranian "volunteers." The press conference was marked by scathing remarks, in the form of questions by most of the journalists who were present, considering the flagrant defiance to the country's authorities vested in Sadiki's communique, according to which Beirut would do well to submit.



Ahmed Al-Sadiki, addressing the journalists during his press conference.

The press conference took place at the press union's headquarters, before its president, Mr Riad Taha, who in the meantime was careful to point out in his opening statement that "the circumstances surrounding the announcement of the program of sending Iranian volunteers to the South have aroused fear, anxiety and confusion among the Lebanese people, instead of reassuring them."

"There is no doubt," Mr Taha went on to say, "that the Iranian revolution has had a significant impact on Lebanon and the Arab countries. It was natural that a certain understanding prevail between Arab governments and the Iranian revolutions, most especially in terms of the struggle against Israel. However, disputes have marked the relations between the government of Avatollah Khomeyni and some Arab governments, different because of contradictions appearing among the various ones who are themselves responsible for the Iranian revolution." Moreover, on the subject of this strange press conference, Mr Taha emphasized that "it would be preferable for the Iranian volunteers to coordinate their activities with the Lebanese and Syrian authorities, as well as with the PLO, before putting their program into action."

"Soon, Golan, Jordan and the Sinai."

As for Mr Ahmed Sadiki, he declared that "in spite of obstacles which they will confront, the Iranian volunteers will be in Lebanon in the coming days." When asked about his own arrival in Lebanon, he replied: "We have various means of entering Lebanon." When the reporter for L'ORIENT-LE JOUR pointed out that the Lebanese Embassy in Tehran had received instructions not to issue any visa to Iranian nationals, the envoy of Hojjatolislam Mohamed Montazeri answered: "The Lebanese Embassy is a friendly embassy. It issues visas to those expressing a desire of obtaining one." In addition, he stated: "We wish to return to the South to carry out the motto of

Ayatollah Khomeyni: 'Today, Iran--tomorrow, Palestine.' Our purpose likewise is to apply the principles of the international Islamic revolution, which is aimed at supporting the weak in their struggle against the oppressors. We are returning to the South," Mr Sadiki continued, "so that Iran can become a country for confronting the Zionist enemy. The purpose of our coming is to liberate the Arab masses who have been taken hostage by reactionary governments."

And Mr Sadiki went on to say: "We are returning to the South not only to fight Israel but also to lend our moral and material support to the Lebanese and Palestinian people by contributing to the building of hospitals and schools in the South. Our mission in the South is only a first step. The next steps will be Golan, Jordan and the Sinai. We want to reopen the fronts in those countries and we have our own means for achieving that objective. We think that it is necessary to conclude a military defense pact among Lebanon, Iran, Syria and the PLO with the purpose of revitalizing the eastern front. Iran must fill the void caused by Egypt's defection."

After saying this, Mr Sadiki engaged in a dialog with the journalists, which was at times quite animated:

[Question] Do you intend to come to Lebanon by lawful means?

[Answer] We do not wish to return to the South in stealth. It is not our custom to cross borders.

[Question] But the Lebanese authorities have already said they are against your coming.

[Answer] The forces which fear solidarity among peoples militate for the purpose of hampering that solidarity. But I think that the Lebanese state will end up resigning itself to an accomplished fact.

[Question] Don't you think that the sending of Iranian volunteers could lead to further acts of aggression against the South by the Israelis?

[Answer] Most of the volunteers belong to the Iranian armed forces, especially the air force. There are also volunteers in the navy and the infantry. If Israel attacks us, our air force and army will not hesitate to react and deal a crushing blow to the Zionist enemy.

[Question] What is the number of volunteers planning to return to the South?

[Answer] All the Iranian people are ready to become involved in the struggle. The present list includes the names of 10,000 volunteers. We lifted the draft temporarily. The first contingent to arrive in Lebanon will comprise 700 persons.

[Question] The "Amal" movement and the Shi'ite Supreme Council are opposed to your coming. What do you think about that?

[Answer] We are returning to the South to help the Lebanese people and not some party or community. All groups opposed to us will show their true colors in public.

[Question] Are you in conflict with the Shi'ite Supreme Council?

[Answer] There is no conflict between us and any other party. We don't have time to engage in quarrels with organized bodies.

A Collective Visa.

[Question] The "Amal" movement and the Shi'ite Supreme Council favor deploying the Lebanese army in the South. Doesn't that attitude contradict yours?

[Answer] Ask the two organizations that. We are revolutionaries and do not want to be a party to internal political conflicts. It is not our intention to meddle in Lebanon's internal affairs. We are coming to perform an Islamic duty.

[Question] Some reports cite the Iranian volunteers' intention to occupy the Lebanese Embassy in Tehran. What is your feeling on this subject?

[Answer] Those reports are being spread by Zionist circles and their allies. We think of the Lebanese Government as our friend.

[Question] Do you think that Syria will let you through its territory to return to the South?

[Answer] The Syrian authorities have recently issued us a collective visa. But we don't intend to cross the Lebanese borders.

When asked about the matter of the "Iranian volunteers," Imam Hassan Chirazi himself stated yesterday: "This question has two aspects. There is the Iranian aspect: the volunteers are prepared to come and to protect their Lebanese brothers. Their enthusiasm even reaches the point of declaring a hunger strike to obtain the means for making the trip. The other aspect is Lebanon's; it can be found in the framework of Lebanon's strategy for defending the South and its plans for confrontation with Israel."

In answer to another question, Imam stressed that nothing could justify the "quarrels between the Shi'ite and the Palestinians, the former having offered their hospitality to the latter, and having shared their misfortune." He added that there had to be an end to "individual acts of aggression sullyng the Palestinian honor."

STATEMENT BY EX-PRESIDENT CAMILLE SHAM'UN

Beirut L'ORIENT-LE JOUR in French 24 Dec 79 p 3

[Text] Mentioning the situation in Tripoli, President Camille Sham'un issued a new anti-Syrian indictment yesterday, stating in that respect:

"Everything that is happening in Tripoli is because of the Syrians' lusting after that city. They are openly seeking to reinforce the Alawite element there by fighting the pro-Iraqi Baas Party that opposes their notions of domination. Besides, Mr Rachid Karame and his supporters have broken ties, just like those who celebrated national independence day with such an uproar. That explains why the Syrians decided to enforce obedience and to deal with them severely."

Asked about the army's possible entry into Tripoli, the PNL [Lebanese National Party] leader replied:

"First we have to have an army."

Questioned next about the recent accusations by President Assad against the Moslem Brethren, Mr Sham'un stated:

"The Syrian Government takes revenge on this type of Moslem Brethren which stirs up against it, because it does not truly represent the Syrian people; and in this they have the support of most of the population."

When asked if the results issued in Lebanon by the four-party Arab committee seemed encouraging, President Sham'un declared:

"With regard to that committee, I predicted that it would fail ever since it was formed and before it began its working sessions. In my opinion, there was no need to create it. No result can be expected from it and its termination would be far more desirable."

Regional Destabilization.

Before that, the former head of state, commenting on the general situation in the area, stressed:

"The climate is charged with serious threats because the Soviets have amassed some 30,000 soldiers on the border with Afghanistan. In fact, it seems that the 5,000 Soviets in that country have been a source of serious irritation. The United States is deeply concerned with this issue, noting that 3,000 Soviet troops can be deployed just as they please, while the least American move provokes a general outcry. In any event, any action of this kind can cause a tremendous jolt, having an impact and consequences for the entire region. For what is happening in Afghanistan can have fatal repercussions in Iran, spreading next to Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the other areas.

"In sum, these are episodes from the same story. We are thus becoming worried about what could happen soon or in 1980, as President Anwar Sadat said."

9475

CSO: 4800

DISAPPEARANCE OF SYRIANS IN EAST BEIRUT

Beirut L'ORIENT LE-JOUR in French 16 Dec 79 p 1

[Text] Three Syrian civilians and three soldiers, including one officer, were captured in the Eastern section of Beirut at the beginning of December, the FFA [Arab Expeditionary Forces] news bureau made known yesterday, and issued the following statement in that regard:

On December 3, 1979, three Syrian civil engineers working on the reforestation project of Mt Kassoun (mohafazat of Damascus) entered Lebanon by the Masnaa outpost to buy certain materials needed for the project. The three engineers were in a Mercedes 230. When they drove into Beirut, they got lost and wound up in the eastern zone of the capital. Since that time, their fate is not known.

In addition, on December 7, 1979, military jeep No 87,503 of the Arab Expeditionary Forces mistakenly entered the Achrafieh zone by the Fouad Chehab-Tabaria Ring. In the jeep were Lieutenant Ghazi Kneissawi and two enlisted men, Ayman Maaz and Rachid Manla. Armed guards of the Achrafieh militia halted and detained them. To this day, nothing is known of their fate, despite all efforts and contacts made, by the FFA high command and authorities on all levels, to obtain their freedom and that of the three engineers.

9475

CSO: 4800

BANK OF LEBANON RELEASES STATISTICS

Beirut L'ORIENT LE-JOUR in French 23 Dec 79 p 11

[Text] The Bank of Lebanon yesterday released its bi-monthly figures up to December 15, 1979 which, compared to those for November 30, revealed the following:

1. Paper currency increased by about 35 million LL [Lebanese pounds], or about 1 percent, during the first 15-day period of December, which was a natural occurrence in light of the approaching Christmas and New Year holidays, indicating nevertheless the reduced volume of deposits in the Bank of Lebanon. In fact those up front were down by 50 million LL, or about -2.3 percent, and other deposits fell by 47 million (-2.8 percent).
2. At the same time, for the entry "Gold and Foreign Currency," representing our currency's guarantee, an increase of 1 percent was reported, corresponding to the rise in paper currency. Thus, the total was 2,951,221,160.93 LL for mid-December, compared to 2,921,684,530.55 LL for November 30. Thus, the rate of the pound's guarantee stayed at about 80 percent.
3. Advances to the public sector rose by 100 million LL, to 1,231,144,111.08 by December 15. This was apparently due to the fact that, as an exception due to the holidays, the state had to pay civil officials their salary for the following month before December 23.
4. Other credits and accounts receivable by the Bank of Lebanon were down by 184 million LL to 3,983,456,482.24 on December 15, which probably explains the central bank's latest large-scale interventions on the money exchange market by selling dollars against LL's in an attempt to back our currency's exchange rate.

Below are the figures released to us by the Bank of Lebanon:

| | LL - 12/15/79 | LL - 11/30/79 |
|---|------------------|------------------|
| ASSETS | | |
| 1) Gold and foreign currency | 2,951,221,160.93 | 2,921,684,530.55 |
| 2) Advances to public sector | 1,231,144,111.08 | 1,131,144,111.08 |
| 3) Advances to private sector | 89,963,125.65 | 84,191,672.86 |
| 4) Advances required by Law | 1,181,195.35 | 1,168,595.35 |
| 5) Other credits ^{28/67} and accounts receivable | 3,983,456,428.24 | 4,168,014,371.88 |
| TOTAL | 8,256,966,021.25 | 8,306,203,281.72 |
| LIABILITIES | | |
| 1) Obligations up front | | |
| a - paper currency | 3,685,061,327.89 | 3,651,165,929.20 |
| b - deposits up front | 2,165,863,942.64 | 2,216,135,856.84 |
| | 5,850,925,270.53 | 5,867,301,786.04 |
| 2) Other deposits | 1,652,995,382.38 | 1,700,067,817.54 |
| 3) Capital | 15,000,000.00 | 15,000,000.00 |
| 4) General reserves | 263,085,660.55 | 263,085,660.55 |
| 5) Other accounts payable | 474,959,707.79 | 460,748,017.59 |
| TOTAL | 8,256,966,021.25 | 8,306,203,281.72 |

9475

CSO: 4800

NATION'S POLITICAL, ECONOMIC SITUATION REVIEWED

London WEST AFRICA in English 14 Jan 80 pp 55-56

[Text]

IN A MOVE that comes as no great surprise, Lt. Col. Mohamed Khouna Ould Haydalla, the Prime Minister of Mauritania, becomes Head of State and the position of Prime Minister is, at least temporarily, abolished. Lt. Col. Mohamed Mahoud Ould Ahmed Louly, the Head of State, has been dismissed, according to a statement from the governing Military Committee for National Salvation, as have three other members of the Committee. The statement said that the Committee was determined to be rid of those who were not contributing to the national effort of reconstruction. The changes were therefore made to "adapt the political structure to the important tasks of administrative and economic reconstruction and the consolidation of peace."

It is now 18 months since the regime of President Mokhtar Ould Daddah, which brought Mauritania into the Western Saharan conflict in league with Morocco, fell to a military coup d'état. The latest political shake-up is the third since then. In each case it has amounted to strictly military politics with few civilians having an opportunity to participate in the government. However, the political instability in the military leadership is a symptom of the unease and difficulty created by the many problems that face the country.

When the military took over in July, 1978, with Lt. Col. Ould Saleck at the head, the Polisario Front declared a unilateral ceasefire. But Mauritania's position was not

simple; while it was desirable that the country withdraw from the war, economically so disastrous, it was under severe diplomatic pressure from Morocco, which still had up to 8,000 troops in the country, not to move into the Algerian camp. In August last year, the Mauritania finally signed a peace agreement with the Polisario Front and withdrew their forces from the southern portion of the Western Sahara, which the Moroccan army duly occupied.

In the meantime Lt. Col. Saleck had been replaced, and a new government formed in April, 1979, led by Lt. Col. Bouceif, who less than two months later, in late May, was killed in an air crash while landing at Dakar. It was then that Lt. Col. Haydalla moved into the seat of power at a meeting which coincided with increasing Polisario threats against the Saleck government's vacillation. He supported Lt. Col. Louly, who became Head of State, replacing Lt. Col. Saleck, and Lt. Col. Haydalla was appointed Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, a portfolio that he retains in his new capacity as Head of State.

FAKE NEUTRALITY

Mauritania's diplomatic position today is akin to the man who withdraws from the combat and seeks refuge in the neutral zone between the front lines in the hope that the crossfire will go over his head. With Morocco now in nominal control of the Western Sahara, though under heavy

pressure from constant and penetrating Polisario attacks, Mauritania is that much more vulnerable to Moroccan reprisal, or as was once the fear, Moroccan aggrandisement. There remains a problem with the Polisario Front too. Having signed an agreement with the Front, Mauritania withdrew from the Sahara and received in return commitments from the Polisario Front that the latter would never harbour any ambitions towards Mauritania. The fact remains that Mauritania will have to decide whether or not to give some sort of shelter to the Polisario Front. There is a wing in the Mauritanian leadership which calls for a closer alliance with Algeria and the guerrillas. In doing so, Mauritania could have problems similar to those experienced by some hosts of the Palestinian refugees. In the case of Mauritania and the Sahrawi, there are very close ethnic and historical links which could lead to the penetration of the Mauritanian hierarchy by Polisario militants in an attempt to wrest control of the government. Until now one has witnessed the reverse movement whereby Mauritians, often in high positions, have left the country in dissatisfaction with the government's policies — and with a degree of self interest — to join with the Polisario Front. Mauritians also know that the Sahrawi would never be satisfied with just the southern portion of the Western Sahara, leaving the Moroccans with the phosphates at Bou Craa in the north as well as the harbour of El Aiun.

Morocco is now reported to have removed all its troops from Bir Moghrein, where they had been stationed. It leaves a military government in Nouackchott caught in the dilemma of having to avoid provoking the Moroccans to the extent that a stinging backlash might be delivered by King Hassan and at the same time feeling a certain sympathy with the Polisario Front. There is no way that Mauritania can avoid being caught up in the entire structure of events and attempts to resolve the Saharan crisis.

At least Lt. Col. Haydalla has the advantage that under his premiership Mauritania has been extricated from the war and internal disturbances arising from conflict, often provoked for political purposes, between the Moor and black population, have been reduced by the

settlement of the language question. It is estimated that one third of the population is black, living in what is potentially the richest area of the country along the banks of the Senegal River. Tension has arisen in the past, and with more frequency in 1979, over attempts to Arabise the school curriculum and administration. There is evidence that disturbances between the two groups were inflamed by more extreme sections of the society. In addition, President Senghor, for example, has never hidden his sympathy for King Hassan in the present conflict, going so far as to suggest that under particular circumstances, he would envisage requesting the right to self-determination of the black population of Mauritania. However, once the Nouackchott government withdrew from the conflict last August and President Senghor made a brief visit to Mauritania, the disturbances faded away from the political scene, and the much-publicised Front Walfougui, operating from Dakar and aimed at bringing together Mauritania's black population under one political banner, also promptly became something of the past.

The government has, however, introduced a new plan to resolve the linguistic problems in the country. An institute is to be created to promote all the languages in the country: Arabic, Pular, Wolof, Soninke. Under the new law the government aims at establishing four national languages, though Arabic will be the "unifying" language and French will also be made a part of the curriculum. A student therefore must learn his own language, Arabic, and also start on French.

What emerges from this latest palace revolt is that Lt. Col. Haydalla has always been the strongman of the regime from the moment he became Prime Minister. He is also prepared to play a careful diplomatic game, provided he is not impeded in his attempts to re-establish some unity in the country. Hence the allusion, in the military committee statement, to some members, now departed from power, who were not inclined to follow the new leader's path wholeheartedly.

Lt. Col. Haydalla's latest call has been to France, and other countries, for more aid. He is having to cope with a country in which the economic structure has changed

dramatically. Agriculture, which at independence provided 60 per cent of the GNP, now accounts for a mere 20 per cent. The urban population has increased from 30 per cent to 70 per cent, according to a recent report. The catalyst has been the persistent drought which by now has totally altered the physical state of the country. It is to this fact that the new regime must address itself. Last year it imported 800,000 tonnes of cereal. The original plan to resuscitate the economy, launched in September, 1978, has never really been adhered to. The budget is gravely imbalanced and depends on help from friendly states, the most generous contributor being Saudi Arabia.

FACING A CHANGED ECONOMY

The latest efforts to redress the situation have included the participation of Lt. Col. Haydalla in December at the ceremonial laying of the first stone for the Diama dam as part of the Senegal River Development Organisation. Mauritania stands to gain well over 150,000 hectares of irrigated land on completion of the entire project. Banking procedures are being streamlined and short-term loans are being renegotiated in order to lower the debt service from the present 30 per cent of export value to 15 per cent.

All fishing licenses have been temporarily suppressed. With fishing potentially one of Mauritania's biggest sources of revenue, matters had reached a

stage where most of the processing and landing of fish caught in Mauritanian waters by Japanese, Russian, Spanish and Korean licenced ships was occurring outside Mauritanian territory. It is estimated that in 1978 only 0.4 per cent of the catch in Mauritanian waters was landed at Nouadhibou. Investment will now have to go into processing plants, and it will be of interest to see how Mauritania will follow on from the lead given by the FAO plans for the development of fish resources.

The \$500m. Guelb iron mining project is now being realised. The Guelb project should, by 1992, have replaced the Zaouerate mine with an annual production of 12m. tonnes. The national mining company, SNIM, which had been nationalised, is now a mixed economy company in which 29 per cent is held by Kuwait, Morocco and the Islamic Bank.

The plight of SNIM is indicative, to a certain extent, of the hopes that the new government has, and the measure of the task ahead of them. With iron production down to 6,000 tonnes, Mauritania is now having to compete with far greater disadvantages on the world market. Domestically, the railway from Zouerate to Nouadhibou has been operational only occasionally and the port facilities have been far less active. The effect has been under-employment. SNIM and the entire infrastructure for the mining industry occupies 100,000 people.]

CSO: 4420

AMERICAN, WESTERN ATTITUDES TOWARD MIDDLE EAST, IRAN CRITICIZED

Casablanca LIBERATION in French 30 Nov-6 Dec 79 p 3

[Editorial: "The Proscribed World"]

[Text] The United States has anatomized the Middle East by decreeing that 11 Arab countries were a danger zone. The White House claims that its sole intention was to warn American citizens that their country could not guarantee their security in that entire zone. This position, serious in a number of ways, claims the existence of an "instability which affects the area." However, it seems to be hiding a great deal when it starts from current "instability" to end eternal "instability." At this point one may ask what is the reason for the American position? What are the circumstantial or strategic aspects? Is it that the area presents an explicit threat? Or else, is it nothing but a measure to dissuade or even exert pressure on what exists and what could exist? In a few words, considering the motions which are shaking the citadels of imperialist hegemony in the area, would the American position be the prelude to a different policy which the United States might adopt toward the Middle East?

No supposition is to be excluded in advance, for that area is crucial because of its petroleum resources and strategic location. What triggers and justifies all these questions is the fact that even when the Middle East was in the flames of the Arab-Zionist war, the United States felt at no point the need to quarantine it. This ~~shows~~ why the publication of the list of the 11 proscribed countries is bound to trigger fears and apprehensions.

Naturally, the event must be considered within the current context of the Islamic world. One must also not separate it from the Iranian-American conflict. Two phenomena may be noted in margin of this context marked by the triggering of strongly anti-imperialist movements:

1. Like all Westerners, the American suffer from amnesia. They forget that if the Islamic world today is moving and rising against them it is because they became the apostles of obscurantist systems and regressive movements. No single country among those which worry the United States today has avoided, one way or another, the taints of governments which drew their legitimacy only in their alliances with the West, with the former colonial powers. The wave of independence which rose at the end of the 1940's brought to power, thanks to that West, social strata and tribes which quickly declared themselves dynasties. Since then we have become familiar with the reality of these powers: dynasties of royalties, and dynasties of servitude to imperialism, ignoring the aspirations of the peoples. The Arab gulf has had its tyrants as much as the Arab peninsula, Jordan, the areas adjacent to the Red Sea, etc.

Free from despotism since the 18th century and, therefore, blossoming, the West turned subjugation of Arab and Islamic peoples into a lever. It thus hit two birds with one stone: the plundering of wealth through the allies it supported, and the assimilation of Islam with obscurantism, in the course of efforts to make it a mold for despotism. An entire logic had been created on the basis of hegemonistic relations and the scorn felt by imperialism toward the area. This led to the making of tyrants like the Shah and manipulated religious sects which, as though incidentally, ally themselves with those in Seoul "to struggle against communism and atheism."

However, deliberate amnesia is compounded by historical errors. To forget voluntarily means to also be unable to understand. The Americans failed to understand. Having offered their hospitality to a criminal who has nothing to envy Eichman about, they have just committed their second mistake by proscribing the entire area. In both cases, the action in itself would be of marginal value only if it did not conceal a back thought or an even more worrisome "back action." Yet, the United States knows, better than anyone else, that what the peoples of the area and, with them, all oppressed peoples, want is the right to live a life of dignity without political coercion and shameless economic exploitation. If this claim fails to trigger any reaction in the West other than that of denegrating the movements which express it, confrontation results. Hence, the instability the Americans talk about is triggered and fed not by the internal conditions of the area but by the attitude of hostility and lack of comprehension of the West.

2. This crisis which risks to spread beyond the framework of Iranian-American relations raises, actually, questions complicated by the Western attitude.

Medieval Islam and Moslem fanaticism are terms of the conflict which is doing everything possible to resist the denegration of popular movements in the area. However, this refusal to understand is not fortuitous. It proves that the capitalist world is not as yet inclined to give a different pace and content to its relations with the outlying countries.

Beyond all circumstantial aspects of the prevailing situation in the area, there is a reality which states that it is no accident that imperialism is being shaken up in what it considered so far its possession. This area is one of the richest in the world. However, it is also one where misery and poverty are most chronic. It supplies industry and technology with a raw material without which any possibility for scientific and technical development becomes compromised. However, it is also one of the most marginal in terms of the results of this development which makes it even more dependent. In other words, whereas this area is the richest it is also the weakest link in imperialist policy. It is an area where ideological and class contradictions are most sharp because of the crushing impact which imperialism has on its economic potential.

The procrastination which affects the new international economic order has lasted long enough to prove that the capitalist countries, headed by the United States, are far from accepting to give up a comfort based on neglecting or even struggling against the aspirations of the Third World. The failure, 15 days ago, of the Geneva meeting on the transfer of technology eloquently proves the refusal of the capitalist world to abandon a policy of international economic relations imbued by the logic of plunder and dependence.

One would willingly classify these phenomena as speculation or even as fiction if the factual actions of the West did not make them real. In the United States, as in Europe, have not "desert brigades" and special intervention forces been created? It is not a fact that the mission of these forces is to be ready to "defend the interests" of these powers in the oil rich areas of the Middle East? This involves more than a simple projection. The decision of the United States to ban forever stability in these areas leaves no possibility for any illusion as to the chances that relations may be redirected. Furthermore, it does not augur a real Western assumption by the west of responsibilities for establishing a new international economic and social order based on democracy and social justice. Yet, it is against those terms that the stability of the prescribed world stumbles.

5157

CSO: 4400

MOROCCO

PPS POLITBURO MEMBER SIMON LEVY DISCUSSES MOROCCAN-SPANISH RELATIONS

Casablanca AL BAYANE in French 25 Dec 79 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Simon Levy: "It Is the Duty of All Democrats to Help the Rapprochement Between Our Two Peoples"]

[Text] Whatever their stage, whether difficult or positive, Moroccan-Spanish relations are of determining importance to our two peoples on both sides of the Straits. That is why AL BAYANE asked Comrade Simon Levy, member of the Politburo and secretary of the PPS [Party of Progress and Socialism] Central Committee, on his return from Madrid, to inform the national public opinion of the current status of our relations with Spain from the specific viewpoint of the visit of a delegation of the Ain-Diab Commune to Madrid, and the Marrakech colloquium which recently gathered intellectuals from the two countries.

AL BAYANE: Comrade Simon Levy, you have just spent some 15 days on Spanish time or, rather, Hispano-Moroccan time. . . .

Simon Levy: My training and profession of hispanologist rarely allow me to spend time elsewhere. . . .

AL BAYANE: This time it was a massive dose: the meeting of Marrakech and the next day the trip of a municipal delegation to Madrid. Were the results worth it?

Simon Levy: As to the second part of the question, the Ain-Diab delegation gained rich experience in municipal management in various fields. Furthermore, it was welcomed quite warmly by the mayor of Madrid, Prof Enrique Tierno Galvan, who was a major personality in the political struggle under Franco and former president emeritus of the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party]. In turn, the Madrid municipal officials who worked with us were able to gain an idea about their Moroccan counterparts whose major aspects they emphasized. . .

This is yet one more channel in relations between our peoples who frequently live on the basis of preconceived ideas.

AL BAYANE: Basically, the municipal level offers a possibility for "informal diplomacy."

Simon Levy: It is obvious that in our days relations among nations are not limited to state diplomacy. Sister cities, political parties, trade unions, and universities have their own international relations, not considering direct contacts in the fields of sports, culture, etc. . . .

It is understood that, in this case, diplomacy means reciprocal acquaintanceship among nations. From this viewpoint double efforts must be made between Morocco and Spain. We must admit that despite this immediate neighborhood, a shared cultural heritage and interrelated history and common problems, the reciprocal familiarity between the two nations leaves a great deal to be desired. The group of Moroccan and Spanish intellectuals was set up to promote such acquaintanceship and contribute to the rapprochement.

AL BAYANE: Are we correct that Marrakech was the second meeting?

Simon Levy: The first took place in Madrid, last May, following the adoption of a document published in AL BAYANE and by the entire Moroccan national press. In Spain the reverberations of this meeting were far lesser. This indicates more than the reticence of some circles caused by the political situation--we are familiar with the position taken by the main Spanish parties on the problem of the Sahara--as well as some prejudices in public opinion based on recent history.

AL BAYANE: Is it not paradoxical that Spanish public opinion has been more affected by our own as a result of this period?

Simon Levy: Unquestionably. Yet, there are nuances. As a colonized people we had to fight Spanish and French colonialism. Having obtained our independence and territorial integrity, our people were quickly willing to wipe everything off and public opinion retained minimal vestiges. Many people are well familiar with the fact that the Franco system oppressed both nations. Cities and islands in the north remain occupied. However, this obstacle is not considered by us as a hindrance to the development of good relations. Our public opinion is rather under-informed and has preserved the obsolete image of the miserable Spaniard coming to look for work in Morocco.

On the Spanish side the matter is more complex. However, we should beware of generalizations. Few people know, for example, that in 1909, in Anoual, Spain experienced a movement against colonial warfare which went so far as to trigger an insurrectionist general strike, demonstrations

by soldiers, etc. . . . Since then Spanish public opinion--on the left--was traumatized by the use of Moroccan soldiers against the 1934 strikes in the Asturias and, above all, by the use of "regulars" in the civil war, Franco's "Moorish guard," etc. It either forgets or ignores that this was the result of the refusal of the republican governments to settle the colonial problem. It is also ignorant of the fact that several thousands of Moroccans joined the ranks of the democrats and paid a stiff price following Franco's victory.

AL BAYANE: All this is somewhat obsolete today, is it not?

Simon Levy: Spanish public opinion was also turned bitter toward us by Franco's propaganda which linked the stereotypes of the superiority of the colonizer with "pro-Arab" demagoguery which emphasized the "ingratitude" of the Moroccans. There have been a number of crises in 20 years: the struggle for the annexation of the northern zone (1956), the Ifni and Sahara wars (1957-58), the Green March, not counting the fishing question, and others. This has left a vague bitterness exploited by some circles which are enraged by their failure to complete the Franco plan. . . . Let us point out that the attitude of the parties of the center and the left, favoring the Algiers theses, did not improve matters.

However, I repeat, one must not generalize excessively. We note an improvement in some press and political sectors. Specific problems could, finally, provide a base for rapprochement. "We are sentenced to reach an understanding," is a statement frequently repeated in the Marrakech meeting.

AL BAYANE: Yet, this meeting was criticized in both countries. . . .

Simon Levy: In my view, such criticism was both justified and unilateral. It was justified to the extent to which the discussion was unbalanced on the Moroccan side, which favored one trend, and on the Spanish side, by the absence of well-known political personalities (Ruiz Gimenez being absent). However, we must say that, on the Moroccan side, all the trends were there.

Coordination among them could have been better balanced had some members of the committee not been unavailable (Laroui was absent for three full months) and if some personalities had not withdrawn.

In my view, the danger to be avoided is, above all, the fact that our meetings may appear to be semiofficial. This would compromise increased contacts with the Spanish left.

After the meeting, the liaison committee discussed these matters and the committee itself was expanded.

As to the meeting, its merit was to bring together for a discussion intellectuals of good will from both countries for a few days. The discussion led to the drawing of an objective balance of relations between the two countries, which was frequently frank, in the course of seeking the causes for this situation.

The way in which it was reflected in our country and in Spain reveals a certain progress in the interest shown in the matter on either side of the Straits. This was the purpose sought by the signatories of the Madrid manifesto.

AL BAYANE: In conclusion, could you say a few words on your own participation?

Simon Levy: I mostly emphasized the need for the democrats of both countries to understand the national aspects of the struggle waged by the other nation. Our nation is still feeling in its flesh the consequences of the colonial division of the Sahara. The democrats, whatever friend they may be following, should be aware of the fact, proved by experience, that the progress (or failures) of democracy on one side of the Straits strengthens (or threatens) democracy on the other.

In recent years Morocco and Spain have been exposed to the process of democratization, stemming from the struggles waged for years and consequent power relations. Major differences exist on the level of the social context of each country. However, similarities are evident as well. There has been no violent break. There has been a search for consensus, etc. I believe that in both cases it is the historical depth of these two peoples with an old civilization and with long established countries that facilitated the search for original and tolerant forms of transition.

In the course of this rapprochement among nations it is, once again, the duty of the democrats to be in the vanguard.

5157

CSO: 4400

CLUB MEDITERRANEE CULTURAL EVENT CRITICIZED

Casablanca LIBERATION in French 30 Nov-6 Dec 79 p 3

[Statement by the Central Bureau of the Moroccan Writers' Union: "The Moroccan Writers Denounce. . ."]

[Text] Some Moroccan newspapers carried news concerning Club Mediterranee which is planning to organize a cultural week in Marrakech on the theme of "Third Festival of Contemporary Moroccan Art." The UEM [Moroccan Writers' Union] has learned that this year the participants will be exclusively Moroccan. Furthermore, those in charge of some sectors, on the regional as well as national level, will assist in the holding of this festival whose activities will affect the club as much as the city of Marrakech.

The UEM would like to specify the following on the subject:

1. The Club Mediterranee, which is rejected by national public opinion, would like to prove its legality by involving Moroccan intellectuals in its project which opposes our aspirations toward national and democratic liberation.
2. The festival involves seemingly intellectual activities whereas, in fact, such activities are a mask which goes on, at all levels, promoting the neocolonialist exploitation of our country.
3. This kind of actions aims at assimilating and distorting the slogans and concepts of our national and democratic culture, separating the cultural struggle from its social and political context, and depriving this culture from its popular and progressive content.

The UEM denounces this festival and the alliances which are helping to hold it. It also denounces all Moroccan "intellectuals" which would participate in it, directly or indirectly. It also calls upon all cultural, political, and trade union forces, on the regional and national levels, to expose the objectives of this festival and to assume their full responsibilities.

The political independence for which all of us are struggling can be achieved only if it is in all areas, in the area of culture, above all.

5157

CSO: 4400

END

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

28 FEB '80

MAK

